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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Japan
~~Strategic~~ Bombing Survey
3/1 9, x 110

1945 SEP 19 PM 12 24

18 September 1945

SS

Subject: U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan

To : The Director

Via : Mr. E. J. Putzell

1. In accordance with General Donovan's request, I am forwarding to you attached hereto copies of the memorandum from Mr. D'Olier to General Donovan, dated 1 September 1945, and General Donovan's memo of 14 September in answer thereto.

H. S. Little
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, MO Branch

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14 September 1945

SUBJECT: Office of Strategic Services Assistance to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan

TO : Mr. Franklin D'Olier, Chairman
Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum of 1 September 1945 on the above subject.

2. Within the limits of its facilities and resources, this Agency accepts the request contained in the subject memorandum and will comply therewith, subject to the conditions mentioned therein.

3. I am extremely happy that we are in position to be of assistance to you, recognizing, as I do, the importance of this Survey.

William J. Donovan
Major General, AUS
The Director

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SUBJECT: Office of Strategic Services assistance to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan

TO: Major General William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services

1. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey requests the cooperation of the Office of Strategic Services in making available to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey the following personnel, equipment and services, as verbally agreed upon for the strategic Bombing survey of Japan:

a. United States stationed Issei personnel listed in APPENDIX A on detached service, commencing on or about 5 September 45, and ending on or about 15 December 45, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey assuming salary and per diem commitments from date of assignment to date of release. (Approximately 20).

b. China and India stationed Issei and Caucasian personnel listed in Appendix B, Office of Strategic Services to bring them to the United States by 25 September 45; that filing, the assignment of these personnel on detached service to United States Strategic Bombing Survey at their present foreign stations, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey assuming responsibility for their transportation to Japan. Length of service, and financial arrangements apply here as under (a) above. (Approximately 12).

c. United States stationed consultant personnel listed in Appendix C, on either a part time consultant basis, or on full time detached service, as mutually agreed by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and Office of Strategic Services. (Approximately 6).

d. Military personnel, both United States and foreign stationed, listed in Appendix D, on Detached Service commencing on or about 5 September 45 and ending on or about 15 December 45, at which time temporary duty orderswill return them to the control of the Office of Strategic Services in the United States of America, or in the theater, at the discretion of the Office of Strategic Services. (Approximately 25)

e. Not less than two no more than four Issei translators for service with U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Headquarters in Washington, D.C. under service and financial arrangements as in (a) above.

f. Three or four Office of Strategic Services (MO Branch) specialists, on Detached Service, with length of service and salary provisions as under (a) and (d) above, who will act as liaison personnel between Office of Strategic Services and U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, one of these to return to United States

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after 30 days service in Japan, in order to make arrangements for the final disposition, upon completion of the survey, of the personnel loaned by the Office of Strategic Services. For administrative purposes, these men will be under the direction of the Survey.

g. Twelve special recording devices together with tapes and repair equipment sufficient for the duration of the survey.

h. Background and intelligence reports concerning Japanese leaders and institutions currently in Office of Strategic Services files in Washington.

2. It is understood that the questionnaire forms, copies of Japanese translations of the forms, copies of the answers resulting from the interviews, and the recordings will be made available to the Office of Strategic Services for study upon receipt in Washington, D.C. The use of this material by the Office of Strategic Services will be so organized that it will not interfere with coding and machine tabulation procedures to be established by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in Washington.

FRANKLIN D'Olier

Chairman

4 Incls.

1 - Appendix A
2 - Appendix B
3 - Appendix C
4 - Appendix D

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 45 REC'D 2124 1 SEPTEMBER 45

TO CALCUTTA, KANDY, NEW DELHI

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

WD

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, MAGRUDER, FIELD SECTION,

SECRET

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

PRIORITY. FROM DONOVAN AND LITTLE TO COUGHLIN FOR WITHROW.
INFORMATION: RYAN.

1. AT REQUEST OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY WD HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH CERTAIN PERSONNEL WILL BE SENT TO JAPAN ON DS FOR 90 DAYS AND CERTAIN PERSONNEL WILL BE USED AS CONSULTANTS IN US. SURVEY IS A TOP PRIORITY PROJECT TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.

2. IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL TO ASSIST SURVEY IN ITS MISSION IS NECESSARY. IF TELBERG KLEIMAN RUGGLES ROGERS AND BUCKING HAVE NOT YET LEFT OR DO NOT HAVE AIR PRIORITY WHICH WILL PUT THEM IN WASHINGTON BY 15 SEPTEMBER THEN MAKE PRIORITY ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY TO THAT END SO THEY CAN RETURN.

3. 6 JAPANESE NOW ON AIR PRIORITY TO RETURN TO US WHOM WE UNDERSTAND ARE IWAMATSU, KURODA, HARUYAMA, MIYAMOTO, OSAKI, AND SUGAHARA SHOULD ARRIVE IN US NO LATER THAN 5 SEPTEMBER. KLEIMAN AND RUGGLES CAN BE ESCORTING OFFICERS.

4. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE FOLLOWING JAPS ON SEA PRIORITY WHO SIGNIFIED DESIRE REMAIN IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE NEEDED SOONEST. IF THEY HAVE NOT ALREADY LEFT THEN EXPEDITE THEIR RETURN TO US BY AIR BY 25 SEPTEMBER: OKUJI FUJII, HOSHIDE, OHTA, SHIMOMURA, TAKEDA, YAMAMOTO, USUDA, YAMASAKI, KANO, YOSHIDA, YASHIRO. DESIGNATE LT. SIMMONS AS ESCORTING OFFICER.

5. HAVE JAPS NOT NAMED HERE IN AND NOW IN CALCUTTA AND NOT SELECTED BY YOU WITH EXCEPTION OF ONINO JAPS WHO ARE RETURNING BY AIR RETURN TO US BY SEA PRIORITIES [illegible] THEM.

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE ORIGINATING

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 45

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES TO CALCUTTA, KANDY, NEW DELHI.

TRANSMIT

SECRET

6. ADVISE WASHINGTON EXACT TRANSPORTATION STATUS OF EACH OF ABOVE CATEGORIES IMMEDIATELY.

7. WAR DEPARTMENT RADIOING TODAY REQUESTING THEATER COMMANDER TO ASSIGN AIR PRIORITIES SUFFICIENT FOR THIS PERSONNEL TO MEET ABOVE DEADLINES (THIS OF COURSE MEANS REGARDLESS OF THEIR PRESENT TRANSPORTATION STATUS IF NECESSARY). WAR DEPARTMENT CABLE TO NEW DELHI AND KUNMING DESIGNATES RYAN AS CONTACT NEW DELHI, WITHROW AS CONTACT CALCUTTA, AND DALIN AS CONTACT KUNMING.

8. PLEASE EFFECT IMMEDIATE COORDINATION YOUR END.

FOOTER 3247 1 SEPTEMBER 45 RAS RQ WJD/MSL MSL

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30 August 1945

Major General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

First, may I tell you how honored I feel to have been associated with you - even though my capacity was minor - in the magnificently performed work which you organized and conducted for the benefit of our country.

Second, complying with your request I attach a brief opinion on the Japanese situation, for whatever it is worth. At least, it expresses my honest belief.

Third, with your permission I attach a letter to you concerning the North Pacific fishery situation in its international aspects.

Let me assure you that the uniform consideration which you have shown me is most sincerely appreciated.

Yours respectfully,

Edward W. Allen

EDWARD W. ALLEN

Attachments
Memorandum concerning
Japanese situation
Letter concerning North
Pacific fishery situation
Copy of letter to Mr.
Clayton dated Feb. 7, 1945

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MEMORANDUM CONCERNING JAPANESE SITUATION

One's opinion concerning the Japanese situation should be based not only upon historical and current happenings but largely upon an understanding of Japanese psychology. This last is most difficult for an American to grasp. I shall give my personal reactions.

Face plays an enormous part in Japanese life. Abstract morality plays little part. The odium of being caught in deceit attaches to being caught, not to being guilty. Politeness, the artificial laugh, the suppression of emotional display, may all assist in concealing the true mental reaction of a Japanese. Not even the Prussian equals the Japanese militarist in brutal arrogance - his reformation is improbable. Undoubtedly anti-militarist merchants exist, but the sincerity of the peace-loving professions of many merchants, particularly those belonging to the great families, is questionable. Even were it true that the Emperor was less war-minded than his advisers, he certainly acquiesced in their playing up his divinity and their misuse of Shintoism with military objectives in mind. He may not be as bad as some of his subjects but he is far from innocent.

Applying some of these generalizations we note in connection with the Potsdam Declaration and what followed that there were attempts at delay, that there were deliberate omissions and misinterpretations in broadcasting the Declaration (reminiscent of the misinformation given the Japanese people as to the Lytton Report), that a desperate attempt was made to preserve the power of the Emperor, that there have been smiles, bowings, professions of innocence, assertions of high motives, - every effort to maintain face and prepare the people for a revival of the Japanese type of nationalism.

My belief is that the military elements, with the secret approval of some if not all of the powerful merchants and of the Emperor himself, will make every effort to conceal and preserve every military weapon, supply and facility possible and to maintain a military ambition and psychology on the part of the people. At the same time there will be an outward semblance of conformity with our desires, an obsequious catering to our fancies, and an aggressive attempt to propagandize the American public into a false belief in

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complete Japanese reformation. It would not surprise me to hear of numerous professions of Christianity.

This does not imply that the situation is hopeless. All Japanese are not inherently bad. Liberal-minded Japanese will probably come forward and express themselves when once it is safe to do so. Japanese are industrious. Conditions might develop which would afford greater opprotunity for the individual and open the way for our own appropriate propaganda.

What I do imply is that our military occupation of strategic Japanese posts is not enough. In order to secure any permanent benefit of our victory we must eliminate all Japanese military facilities (preservation of necessary police force can be worked out) and activities including military education and other propaganda. We must exert direct positive control over all government authorities including the Emperor who, so long as he is kept at all, should become a puppet as were so many of his ancestors. We must attempt to undo what the militarists have been doing in the way of building up their type of public opinion.

And in order that we can work effectively in the peculiar Japanese atmosphere, know what to do and from what to refrain, it is imperative that we know what the Japanese people are thinking as well as what they are doing.

The military occupation will necessarily be for a substantial period of time if it is to be worth while at all. It cannot succeed even then unless there is also an adequate intelligence service far broader in scope than that ordinarily considered as military intelligence.

30 August 1945

Respectfully submitted,

Edward W. Allen

EDWARD W. ALLEN

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30 August 1945

Major General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

You kindly offered to help in getting to the Secretary of State - to whom, without his knowing it, I have been refused admittance - a situation which we of the Pacific Coast believe to be of immediate importance as potentially threatening future peace in the Pacific. We believe the fundamental issues are too important to be left wholly to subordinates.

Fishery disputes have caused wars. Unknown to many, bloody clashes have been common between Russians and Japanese in connection with the Siberian fisheries. It was realization of this fact and that similar clashes between Americans and Japanese, with all their implications, were imminent, which first induced Secretary Hull to take action concerning the Japanese invasion of Alaska fisheries in the middle 1930's.

We will impose peace terms on Japan. Shall we again open the way to turmoil by permitting Japanese fishermen to come across the Pacific and fish alongside American fishermen on our American shores?

So far, although we have furnished Russians on the Siberian Coast with modern fishery facilities, they have not sought to fish on our shores. We have not yet sought to fish on their's. Shall we not seize the present opportunity to fixate that happy situation and avoid the inevitable clashes a change might precipitate?

Basic difficulty within the Department is the apparent failure of the economists, into whose hands the matter has fallen, fully to comprehend the import of the fact that although a can of fish on a grocery shelf is a commodity, an American fish boat 25 miles out at sea alongside a Japanese fish boat arguing over their respective rights does not present a commodity question but one of International Law and diplomacy.

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It is no reflection on the economists to say that such problems are out of their field. How did they get hold of them anyway?

When Mr. Schwellenbach was a Senator he cooperated with representatives of the Pacific fishery industry and of the international fisheries commissions (two such commissions created by treaties with Canada) in convincing Mr. Hull of the necessity for creating a unit in the Department on a policy level to deal with such matters.

When Mr. Stettinius reorganized the Department it would seem that someone, no doubt inadvertently, thought of fish only as a commodity and wholly failed to distinguish between fish in the market and fisheries at sea. So the policy level fishery unit was demoted and misplaced as a minor adjunct to the commodities branch of the Department. When it was suggested to an Assistant Secretary that this error could be corrected, he threw up his hands and said "they" didn't know where else to put it - it didn't fit into the Department diagram. He might have added "So they threw it into the Economics Division cellar". In Canada fisheries rate a Minister.

Before the matter had been wholly turned over to economists, a sound international fishery policy for the United States had been formulated. What has happened to it is one of the present Washington riddles.

It is rumored that one reason that this statement of policy is held up, also the reason why we have been passing up our opportunity to deal with the Soviet and Japanese situations, is that a grand universal scheme of world-wide international fishery conservation is brewing and that to go ahead and do something presently realistic might interfere with this futuristic dream. This is, of course, just a rumor, but why has nothing happened?

It would make this letter too long to dwell upon the outstanding accomplishments of the two international fishery commissions whose American commissioners now wander around the halls of the Department like orphans, with no one on a policy level interested in their diplomatic problems.

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What do we request?

(1) That the statement of national policy for the protection of our fisheries be resurrected and issued - even if it is realistic.

(2) That we handle the Japanese and Russian fishery situations now - before it is "too late".

(3) That fisheries again be granted a unit in the Department on a policy level with a man in charge familiar with the industry and with diplomacy and international law - even if it does require a "change on the chart".

I attach a copy of a letter to Mr. William L. Clayton of February 7, 1945, the original of which letter is apparently a war casualty.

Your help will be much appreciated.

Yours respectfully,

Edward W. Allen

EDWARD W. ALLEN

Attachment
Copy of letter to Mr. Clayton of Feb. 7, 1945.

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February 7, 1945

AIR MAIL

Honorable William L. Clayton
Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Clayton:

In thinking over our discussion of international fishery problems, it occurred to me that I was guilty of an oversight.

With all the questions continuously confronting you, it would be unreasonable to expect you to remember the details of our situation. I greatly appreciated your prompt assurance that you would consider our matters but thought you might welcome an enumeration of some of our points made without amplification.

1. There are two international commissions created by treaties with Canada, dealing with North Pacific fisheries--salmon and halibut. Expanding the jurisdiction of these commissions and creating new commissions for other areas are right now in contemplation.

2. The existing commissions have had remarkable substantive success but their experience is perhaps even more important as illustrative of a new practical and successful type of international cooperation which might be extended to other fields.

3. The accomplishments of these commissions are imperiled by the application of the "three mile rule" as to territorial waters if applied to coastal fisheries. In the case of halibut, almost 90% is caught more than three miles off shore. In the case of salmon (e.g., Bristol Bay and salmon, one of the most valuable fisheries in the world), many runs can be intercepted off shore.

4. Before the war, Japan directly threatened and had instigated a ruthless system of exploitation of fisheries off

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other nations' coasts, including our own. There were also threats from other countries.

5. Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, and ourselves, both before and since war started, have been and now are directly concerned with the problems involved. Immediate solution is needed not merely because of the war food supply, important as that is, but because of serious inherent potential international friction.

6. Although economic values are, of course, at stake, the problems are not economic but are strictly problems of international law and diplomacy--a point which apparently was completely overlooked in last year's reorganization of the Department.

7. The Department had previously recognized the true nature and importance of these problems and had created a special position to deal with them, giving the occupant the dignified status, first, of Special Adviser to the Counsellor, then, on the death of Judge Moore, of Special Adviser to an Assistant Secretary of State.

8. In last year's reorganization, undoubtedly because of the misconception that "fish" inevitably meant economics, this Special Adviser was assigned to the economic division which, in fact, had no interest in international law or diplomacy. Also, the Adviser's status, from the standpoint of protocol, was reduced, thereby weakening his position in foreign negotiations.

9. The commissions and the Pacific Coast fishing interests, both employers and employees, had been happy over the previous interest taken in their problems by the Department and in the selection of Mr. Lee Pourgeon as Special Adviser.

10. These international commissions, whose members serve without pay, frankly feel that they are entitled to have some representative of the State Department of the rank of Assistant Secretary who will recognize their affiliation with the Department, take an interest in their work and with whom they may establish contacts.

Yours very truly,

Edward W. Allen,
Chairman.

EWA:lmp-b

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August 18, 1945

The attached are suggestions and proposals which the members of Green's Project drafted, after thorough and serious discussion, for the benefit of those who are to be made responsible for the direction of the Allied Military Government for Japan. Not only do we consider these pertinent and will contribute materially, if applied correctly, towards facilitating the administration of the Military Government, but we even consider their adoption imperative IF the Allied Nations are to fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, namely, preparing a way for a new, democratic Japan which will live in peace with the rest of the world in years to come, and if they would see the permanent stationing of occupation forces made unnecessary.

It must be constantly borne in mind that the time to transform old Japan into a new democratic Japan is <u>now</u>. And it must be started without any loss of time. Already many precious days have been wasted during which the very reactionary forces of Japan which brought about the present catastrophe to the Japanese people and the entire Far East have been trying frantically to bolster their tottering positions and to re-establish their so-called "last line in defense of the national polity". Any further loss of time may very well result in irretrievable defeat in this all-important matter of winning the peace.

The various proposals herein set forth deal only with the most essential elements. Details which have to be filled in on the spot, and which must take into consideration the day-to-day developments, are purposely left out. It would indeed be unwise if we were to be enmeshed in details and lost sight of the over-all picture of the most important problems.

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To some extent, the measures suggested here may appear too strong, and might even give the impression that we, out of over eagerness to realize a democratic Japan, even tend to impose democratic forms upon Japan without waiting for the gradual awakening of the Japanese people themselves. To those who may entertain such thought, we must point out the fact that we must struggle <u>against</u> those reactionary forces that are trying to re-form their line, and also at the same time must race against time. In this connection, it is important that we realize the fact that the old ruling circles of Japan were defeated but not beaten and that they are still in control of ALL the state apparatus as well as educational, propaganda facilities, including newspapers and radio, while we most definitely do not. This means that most of the aces and jokers in this all-important game are on the enemy's side, and that our only advantage is that we are in the right, and we have our firm belief that right must triumph over evil in the end. The greatest weakness of the democracies is always the fact that they are slow to start, and always fumble through. Of course, in the final analysis the democracies will win out. Yet, there is no reason why the democracies must always waste energy and suffer more sacrifices.

Throughout our proposals two basic points are stressed. One is that at all times, and wherever it is permissible, utmost encouragement to the assertions of popular will and individual initiative must be given; the other, that in order to avoid unnecessary disturbances during the transition period the existing State apparatus in Japan must be utilized to maximum advantage insofar as it is possible without contradicting the basic principle as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration, i.e., creation of a peaceful and democratic Japan.

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For this reason, wherever and whenever it is permissible, we propose that the Allied Military Government compel the Emperor and the Japanese Government to take "democratic actions" while, in general, we will always appeal to the Japanese people directly for cooperation with that policy. In this manner, the democratic awakening of the Japanese people can be brought about.

We drafted these proposals, not with the hope that they may fall in the hands of some who might gain something from them, but with the determination and conviction that they will be adopted, and in the hope that the day when peace is restored in the Far East, and all of the Allied occupation forces can be withdrawn without the slightest worry, will be materially hastened.

Naturally, all of the proposals are worked out on the assumption that we will be assigned to posts wherein we will be able to contribute to the materialization of these proposals of ours, as well as other similar proposals.

Members of Green's Project.

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1. Conditions the Japanese Government must be made to put into effect on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. 5 pages

2. Suggested draft of Proclamation of the Allied Military Government in Japan. 2 pages

3. The method to basically correct the wrong impressions given the Japanese people by the Japanese government regarding the contents of the Potsdam Declaration, as well as the reply of the four powers to the Japanese Government. 4 pages

4. Immediate basic problems facing the Allied Military Government.

5. Potsdam Declaration:

   (a) Japanese interpretation of the Potsdam Declaration for dissemination purposes to the peoples of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

   (b) Potsdam Declaration as reported to the G.E.A. (translation with original Romaji text attached).

   (c) Comparison of the original text with the Japanese text disseminated by Domei to G.E.A. on July 28th.

   (d) Full English text of the original Potsdam Declaration.

   (e) First Japanese note of acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, August 10, 1945.

   (f) Full English text of Byrnes' note on behalf of the four powers to the Japanese Government August 11th.

6. List of reactionary organizations. *

7. List of liberals and liberal democratic organizations. *

* We have refrained from making these two lists for two reasons:
  1) The Kempeitai, Home Ministry, has the most complete and up-to-date lists, which they can be forced to produce for use of the Allied Military Government upon our arrival in Japan.
  2) The best lists we could produce in this country would be still too incomplete, and it is dangerous to base action solely upon such lists, no matter how complete they may be considered to be.

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Conditions the Japanese Government must be made to put into effect on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. (Suggested by Green's Project).

Disarmament, ceding of territories, punishment of war criminals, as well as the supervision of Japan's internal problems such as finance, transportation and communication, welfare, agriculture and commerce, will conform in the main to the measures adopted in regard to Germany. The following are terms specifically applicable to Japan alone.

1) The right of the Emperor to reign over and govern Japan shall be put under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Therefore, the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese government shall promptly and to the letter take all such measures as the Allied Supreme Commander may deem necessary for the carrying out of the articles of surrender.

(According to the Japanese Constitution the right of reigning over and governing Japan is vested in the Emperor and the Emperor alone. In view of this fact, the use of the phrase "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government, etc." in the Byrnes reply to Tokyo of August 13th seems to have been slightly ill-advised.)

2) In conformity with the Potsdam Declaration, the ultimate form of the Japanese Government shall be decided by the freely and democratically expressed will of the Japanese people. Therefore, the Allied Nations, in deference to the Potsdam Declaration, will support the building of a Japan based upon the popular expression of the people. The Allied Nations in no way should give assurance or support to the perpetual continuation of the Emperor system or the so-called "national polity".

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3) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall respect the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration, which they accepted, and shall, under orders of the Supreme Allied Military Governor, give full cooperation to fulfill the said declaration, and strive for the building of a democratic new Japan.

4) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall remove or amend all such articles of the Japanese Constitution, national laws, ministerial decrees and ordinances as will impede the effectuating of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

5) The Emperor and the Japanese Government, in compliance with the Potsdam Declaration, shall abolish or reorganize all such central and local governmental organs as will obstruct the democratization of Japan.

6) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall endeavor to acquaint the whole nation fully and accurately with the policy and aims of the Allied Military Government and endeavor to urge the people to cooperate with the Allied Military Government and the occupying troops.

7) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall abolish such bureaus and departments of the central and local administrations as will obstruct the fulfillment of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration; immediately dissolve the Ex-Service Men's Association and all other militaristic, chauvinistic organizations, Rightist Terroristic organizations, and reactionary nationalistic organizations; punish severely those terrorists who persecuted advocates of democracy, liberalism, and international cooperation, or conspired to instigate territorial conquests by armed force, and shall strictly suppress in

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the future activities of similar persons. Furthermore, it shall be necessary to bar all such persons who participated in these conspiracies and movements from responsible positions.

(The rosters of these anti-democratic organizations, as well as their aims are on file in the Keiho-Kyoku (Security Bureau) of the Ministry of the Interior. These persons can be rounded up in one swoop if the chief of the Security Bureau issues the order by the "Police Telephone" to the chiefs of police departments of the prefectures throughout the country.)

8) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall strictly forbid all speeches, movements and organizations contrary to the Potsdam Declaration.

9) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall recognize the freedom of speech, religious belief, thought, and democratic political organization in support of the Potsdam Declaration, and not in opposition to or interference with the democratization of Japan; they shall recognize the freedom of occupational organization, and also the right of collective bargaining by such organizations.

10) The Emperor and the Japanese government, in conformity with the Potsdam Declaration shall abolish government support of such Shinto shrines throughout the country as tend to interfere with the democratic tendencies of the people; they shall effect changes in the national holidays.

(If the Japanese government should object to this measure on the ground of "Freedom of Religious Belief", the Allied Military Government can point out the fact that the Japanese Government itself has hitherto maintained that "Shinto is not religion", and put the shrines under the jurisdiction of the Shrine Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. The Allied Military Government may pay particular attention to the fact that all matters pertaining to religion are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education; that the so-called Denominational Shinto (13 in number) are under the Education Ministry, and they are distinguished from the National, or State, Shinto.)

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11) The Emperor and the Japanese Government shall, in conformity with the principles of democracy, support the active operation of the system of self-government on the part of the Japanese people in the central administration or in local administration, by bodies selected by fair and simple elections, absolutely free from interference or obstruction from the government or officials. And they shall strive toward the realization of a democratic governmental structure, based on free and equitable system of representation.

12) The Emperor and the Government, in conformity with the Potsdam Declaration, shall recognize women's suffrage, and their right to be elected to public offices, on equal terms with men, under the universal suffrage law; they shall also open a way for their appointment to governmental positions.

13) The Emperor and the Japanese Government, in deference to the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration, shall prohibit former Army and Navy officers to use their former ranks; they shall abolish all the pension system for the benefit of former military officers and former appointed officials by the central administration, with the exception of democratic reliefs to those of the wounded and disabled veterans who require relief; they shall endeavor to effect relief of war victims, families of the war dead, and relief for the unemployed.

14) The Emperor, in conformity with the Potsdam Declaration, in order to promote and encourage the democratic tendencies within Japan, shall abolish the peerage system, radically revise the structure and designation of the upper house of the Diet; in case a bicameral system is deemed necessary, the upper house shall consist of representatives of local prefectures and Hokkaido, as well as representatives of trade associations throughout the country.

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15) The Emperor and the Japanese Government, in order to carry out the terms of the surrender, shall order all governmental and public officials, whether of the central or local administration, to cooperate fully with the officials of the Allied Military Government in the performance of their duty; they shall see to it that these officials of the Allied Military Government shall have free access to all the extant papers, documents, reports and statistics.

16) The Emperor and the Japanese Government, in deference to the principles of the Potsdam Declaration, shall immediately and unconditionally release all those who were arrested and have been incarcerated because of their connection with democratic movements, or of their ideological tendencies, such as those who have opposed Japan's war of aggression, the anti-militarists, pacifists and labor leaders, and restore their civil rights. Furthermore, they shall publicly declare that in the future all the democratic, pacifistic, and internationalistic movements and thoughts shall not be suppressed, and that they shall faithfully carry out this pledge.

17) The Emperor and the Japanese Government must recognize the right to return to the homeland of the fighting forces, civilian military personnel, as well as non-combatants, who have been held as Prisoners of War by the Allies in this war. They must declare that no punishment or discrimination shall be meted out to them, and carry out this promise faithfully.

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Methods to basically correct the wrong impressions given to the people by the Japanese Government regarding the contents of the Potsdam Declaration, as well as the reply of the Four Powers to the Japanese Government:

Following the official signing of the surrender documents in Tokyo, and simultaneously with the rough completion of the disarmament of the Japanese forces in various areas, it is suggested that the Military Government take the following steps:

1) The representatives of the Military Government to convey secretly the following to the Emperor and Prime Minister Higashi-Kuni, through ~~the~~ Marquis Kido, Keeper of the ~~Kamk~~ Privy Seal, and Prince Konoye, Vice Premier:

(a) The cabinet (headed by Prince Higashi-Kuni, who served in succession since the China Incident as Supreme War Councilor, Commander of the forces attacking Nanking, Commander in Chief of the Home Defense Armies) might conflict with the application of the Potsdam Declaration; therefore, the Emperor is to accept speedily the resignation en masse of the said Cabinet and order democratic, liberal, internationalistic, progressive statesmen to form a cabinet.

(b) Instruct the President of the Cabinet Board of Information to publish in all papers and broadcast from all radio stations throughout the country, Japanese translations and elucidatory commentaries (which the Military Government authorities deem suitable) of the entire text of the Potsdam

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Declaration, as well as the replies of the four governments as received by the Japanese Government on August 13th.

NOTE: The main objectives of the above measures are:

(a) To correct fundamentally the so-called "attitude and policy of the United Nations regarding the Emperor and national policy" as purposely distorted, omitted and incorrectly disseminated to the people by the Government of Japan through the newspapers and radio, which are government-controlled.

(b) To explain to the Japanese people that the Allied governments in no way intend to give aid to the old system. On the contrary, that the allied nations sincerely wish the democratic awakening of the Japanese people and that they desire nothing less than the democratization of Japan.

(c) To make it clear to the Japanese people that the Allies will station occupation forces until such time as the above-mentioned objective is achieved.

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At the same time, it is necessary for the Allied Military Governor to issue a proclamation or a statement to the following effect through newspapers and radio broadcasts throughout the nation:

1) The Potsdam Declaration, which the Emperor and the Japanese government officially accepted, does not intend, as its text makes clear, to enslave the Japanese people. On the contrary, it earnestly desires to free the Japanese people from the yoke of the dictatorial oppression to which they have hitherto been subjected, and to support the building, by the people, of a free and righteous democratic Japan, truly representative of the will of the people — a governmental structure which will promote the welfare of the masses of the people by the people themselves.

2) The people are asked to advise the Military Government, without reservation, regarding laws, ordinances, institutions, offices, and educational systems and policies which will hinder the realization of this purpose, namely, the democratization of Japan. As freedom of speech and thought are fully recognized, the people should express their opinions on these matters freely and vigorously.

3) An unprecedented opportunity has arrived for those who are earnestly patriotic and desirous of the uplifting and advancement of the Japanese race, whether they are in the field of education, or of journalism, whether they hold government offices or address the public from the pulpit, to strive for their goal aggressively. They must realize that all the democratic nations of the world are behind their efforts to build a new, democratic Japan.

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4) It is the sincere desire of the Allied Military Government to fulfill the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration, and to meet the desires of the people of Japan. On their part, the Japanese people are requested to keep an open mind, recognise the right as right, and the wrong as wrong, and to cooperate with the policy of the Allied Military Government.

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PROCLAMATION NO. 1 - ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN

(Suggested Draft)

I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army and Commander in Chief of all Allied Forces in the Pacific Theater, duly appointed by the President of the United States of America and governments of Great Britain, USSR and the Republic of China, in putting into effect the surrender terms based upon the Potsdam Declaration, which have been accepted by the Emperor and the Government of Japan, do hereby proclaim and declare to the people of Japan as follows:

The prime objective of the present Military Government is to bring about, on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration, the establishment of a popular regime for and by the Japanese people, who truly love peace and desire prosperity, by doing away forever with the source of all evils, namely, the authority and forces which, without, conspired conquests of other countries by armed force and, within, have oppressed the people.

The people of Japan, correctly understanding the purpose of the present Military Government, should endeavor to stabilize their living, recover from the ravages of war, and strive toward the further development of their culture. It is further desired that the people of Japan strive toward the great task of constructing a new and democratic Japan, through their cooperation with the Military Government authorities.

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The basic policy regarding the present Military Government has been conveyed to the Emperor and the Japanese Government. The people of Japan are expected to "break away from the old traditions" and base their future existence on "the great principles of the universe" and strive toward contributing to the progress of mankind.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur,
General of the Army of the U. S.,
Commander in Chief of All Allied
Forces in the Pacific Theater,
Military Governor of Japan.

Date

NOTE:- The style of the proclamation may either be "Bungo-tai" (written style) or "Kogo-tai" (spoken style). However, in order to strike a proper balance between it and the Imperial Rescripts, which are written in the classic style, and to retain impressive authority, the above sample Japanese text is written in the "Bungo" style, using several well-known phrases contained in the famous "Five Pledges" of Emperor Meiji.

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Immediate basic problems facing the Allied Military Government

Caution is indicated on the part of the Allied Military Government in dealing with the liaison officials of the Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry). In regard to some of the most vital problems there are clear and definite plans for the measures which the Allied Government can adopt. But these are too detailed for discussion here. Besides, all such measures must meet the rapidly changing internal conditions of the country. Pending presentation of the detailed plans to the Allied Military Government upon arrival on the scene, some of the problems are enumerated here, upon which the Allied Military Government must immediately formulate and adopt a definite policy.

1) Propaganda to the Japanese people by the Allied Military Government.
2) Political parties and political movements
3) Officials of the central and local administrations
4) Religions (Buddhists, a small number of denominational Shintoists, and a small number of Christians)
5) Newspapers, magazines and radio
6) Administration of justice
7) Education
8) The maintenance of the public peace
9) Popular reaction to the Military Government administration; secret organizations and movements.

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JAPANESE INTERPRETATION OF THE POTSDAM DECLARATION FOR DISSEMINATION [illegible] TO THE PEOPLE OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE.

Source: Domei
Date: August 15, 1945 - 1:30 EWT

(Our document accepting the Potsdam Declaration) was one that crystalized the national determination to consolidate the last line in defense of the national polity, on the understanding that "The Potsdam Declaration does not comprise any demand which will prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler." The reply from the four powers to this document arrived in Tokyo on the 13th. It having become evident by this reply that the last line in defense of the national polity which Imperial Japan was determined to hold was guaranteed, our Empire surrendered to America, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union.

Though the continuity of our national polity is assured, we must all clearly realize the fact that Imperial Japan, after acceptance of the unconditional surrender, is not the Japan of yesterday. We, the people, through perseverance of grievous hardship and suffering, must move forward toward the rehabilitation and reconstruction of our mother country.

Note:- Romaji text attached.

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(POTUDAMUSENGENGA SAIKOO TOOJIS HATOSITENO HEIKANO TAIKENWO SOGAISURU GOTOKI IKANARU JOOKENWOMO FUKUMA ZU) TONO RYOOKAINI MOTOZUITA MONODEATTE KOKUTAIGOJINO SAIGONO ISSENWO DANJITE KOSHOSEIYOOTOYUU MINZOKUTEKINO MEMUINO KESSHOCSITA MONODEATTA KOREMITAIITE YONKOKUNO KAITOOSEKIBUNWA JUSANHI TOOKYOONI TOOCHAKU SITAN ODEATTE KONO KAITOOBUNYORI TEIKOKUNO MAMORINUKANTO SURU KOKUTAIGOJINO ISSENWA HOSHOO SERARETAKOGA AKIRAKATO NATTANO DEARU DAGA TEIKOKUWA BEEISISO YONKOKUNI TAISITE KOOFUKUSITA NO DEARU KOKUTAIWA HOSHOOSERARETA MONDARUGA KONOTEIKOKUGA SEKIJITUNO TEIKOKUNI ARAZARUKOTOWA WARERANO HITOSIKU MEIKISINAKUTEWA NARANAI KOTODEATTE WARERARENA TAEGATAKIO SINOBI AKUMADEMO SOKOKUFUKKOONI MAISIN SINAKUTEWA NARANA.

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POTSDAM DECLARATION

PREAMBLE:

We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agreed that Japan shall be given the opportunity to end this war.

The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the West, are poised to strike the final blow at Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan.

The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the land, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people.

The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by these self-willed militaristic advisors whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshhold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

The following are our terms: We will not deviate from them: There are no alternatives: We shall brook no delay.

1) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

2) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

3) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

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4) Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

5) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.

6) The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech and religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

7) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the payment of just reparation in kind, but not those industries which will enable her to re-arm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

8) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese Armed Forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternate for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

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POTSDAM TERMS AS REPORTED TO OEA

(Compare carefully with full English text)

Date: August 2?, 1945

Source: Domei (in Kana)

We (United Nations) adhere to the following points. There is no other alternative or choice, and these points must be carried out immediately without delay.

1) The authority and forces which schemed and led the nation (text does not specify Japan) into warfare for world domination will forever be eradicated. Militarism will be banned.

2) In order to achieve our objectives (does not indicate if the "our" refers to the United Nations), the various areas in the Japanese homeland designated by the United Nations will be occupied.

3) All conditions set forth in the Cairo Declaration shall be enforced, and the sovereignty of Japan will be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and to such other islands as determined by us.

4) The Japanese armed forces will be completely disarmed.

5) The war criminals will be sternly prosecuted. The Japanese Government must abolish all obstacles which may hinder the revival of democratic tendencies within the nation, and respect fundamental human rights; and recognize freedom of speech and press, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought.

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6) Japan shall be permitted to maintain her industries which will enable her to sustain her economy and make reparation in kind to the United Nations, but industries which will enable re-armament will not be permitted.

7) For the above reason, Japan will be permitted access to raw materials and natural resources, and her participation in world trade will be permitted in the future.

8) Occupation forces of the United Nations will be withdrawn from Japan the moment the above objectives are attained and when a peaceful and responsible government which is founded upon the free manifestation of the will of the people is established.

9) It is urged that the Japanese Government immediately proclaim the unconditional surrender of her entire armed forces. Unless she does so, Japan will rapidly and thoroughly be obliterated.

Note:- English text attached.

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COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL THREE-POWER DECLARATION AND THE JAPANESE CONTRAST VERSION DISSEMINATED TO GHA BY DOMEI ON JULY 28, 1945:

1. The preamble in the original text is completely ignored in the Japanese version.

2. Contrast of Article 1 of the original and the Japanese as disseminated by Domei to the GHA:

   Original Text: There must be eliminated for all times the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

   Domei Text: The above underlined passages were omitted.

3. Contrast of Article 2 with the Domei report:

   Original Text: Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we set forth here.

   Domei Text: The above underlined passage is absent.

4. Contrast of Article 4 with the Domei text:

   Original Text: Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

   Domei Text: The above underlined passage is omitted.

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5. Article 5 with the Domei Text:

Original Text: We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.

Domei Text: It only mentioned that "The war criminals will be sternly prosecuted". (Article 6 of the original text was included in Article 5 of the Domei Text).

6. Article 6, original and Domei texts:

Original Text: The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, etc.

Domei Text: The above underlined passage was translated in Japanese as "resurgence of democratic tendencies".

7. Contrast of Article 7 with the Domei text:

Original Text: Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the payment of just reparation in kind, but not those industries which will enable her to rearm for war.

Domei Text: The above underlined passage was translated as follows: To make it possible for her to meet the just reparation in kind, etc.

8. Contrast of Article 8.

Original Text: To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted, etc.

Domei Text: Completely ignored the underlined passage.

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9. Contrast of Post-script with the Domei Text (Article 9).

Original Text: We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.

Domei Text: We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim an unconditional surrender.

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FIRST JAPANESE NOTE OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE POTSDAM DECLARATION -- Aug. 10,1945

Tokyo, August 10 — The Japanese Government today addressed the following communications to the Swiss and Swedish Governments respectively for transmission to the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union:

"In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor, who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about an early termination of hostilities with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government asked several weeks ago the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-a-vis the enemy powers.

"Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government, in conformity with the August wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace, and desiring to put an end to the untold suffering engendered by the war as quickly as possible, have decided upon the following:

"The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.

"The Japanese Government hopes sincerely that this....."

(Tokyo, DOMEI, in English to the American Zone, Aug. 10, 1945, 7:33 am GWT)

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SIR: I have the honor to
and in reply to inform you
directed me to send to yo
Japanese Government the f
of the United States, the
Republics, and China:

"With regard to the Japan
the Potsdam proclamation
standing that the said dec
prejudices the prerogative
position is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the a
Japanese Government to rule the stat
commander of the Allied powers who
proper to effectuate the surrender t

"The Emperor will be required to aut
the Government of Japan and the Japa
of the surrender terms necessary to ca
declaration, and shall issue his comman
naval and air authorities and to all the fo
wherever located to cease active operations a
and to issue such other orders as the supreme c
give effect to the surrender terms.

"Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

"The armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam declaration are achieved."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration,

James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State.

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TEXT OF ALLIED REPLY -- AUGUST 11, 1945

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of Aug. 10, and in reply to inform you that the President of the United States has directed me to send to you for transmission by your Government to the Japanese Government the following message on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China:

"With regard to the Japanese Government's message accepting the terms of the Potsdam proclamation but containing the statement, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his majesty as a sovereign ruler," our position is as follows:

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the supreme commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

"The Emperor will be required to authorize and insure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the supreme commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms.

"Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports.

"The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

"The armed forces of the Allied powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam declaration are achieved."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Colonel G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

FROM : Major Rex A. Keller
Deputy Chief
Research & Development Branch

SUBJECT : Japanese Free Balloons

It may be quite true, as Mr. Salinger points out, that the menace of Japanese balloons is more serious than most persons imagine and potentially it may be a dangerous weapon, depending of course on how it is employed.

Military Intelligence Service of the Army has investigated very thoroughly all reports of Japanese balloons in this country and has, in every case possible, recovered those balloons which have been found by very close scrutiny and examination.

The possible use of these balloons to carry suicide troops has been immediately discounted by M.I.S. after thorough investigation.

The use of these balloons to send over explosive bombs or chemical warfare agents is not considered serious, although the use of incendiary material to start forest fires or the use of bacteriological warfare agents (no evidence of which has yet been found) may have far reaching effects.

The use of a grappling device to intercept these balloons, as suggested by Mr. Salinger, could conceivably be used but its practicability can be determined only by a thorough and extensive study of all aspects of the problem. It would, among other things, depend on the type of material carried by the balloon, that is, whether it is incendiary, explosive, a chemical warfare agent, or a bacteriological warfare agent; and also on the method by which the material was released from the balloon and exploded or distributed. These are only a few of the factors to be considered in the use of such a device, and it is apparent how extensive this problem might be.

It is quite possible that under certain conditions a method of intercepting and preventing balloons, using the method outlined by Mr. Salinger, might be of value. It is therefore recommended that his suggestion be forwarded to the proper authorities in the War Department for their consideration.

Several M.I.S. reports on this subject can be made available to you if you should desire them.

R. G. Keller

Rex A. Keller, Major AC

RAK:kjb

Attachment

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JUN 9 RECD

Date: 6/8/45

To: ~~Colonel Jefferies~~

Attached: letter from Mr. Salinger
June 7, 1945

PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR COMMENTS
ON THE ATTACHED.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

Col Burns:
Please have letter
prepared in reply
[signature]

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G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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J. D. SALINGER
125 EAST 72 STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
BUTTERFIELD 8-9748

x Salinger, Edgar

June 7, 1945

General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

In my opinion, the menace of the Japanese balloons, which they have been sending over and which threaten to come over here with suicide troops, is much more serious than most people imagine.

At OSS there is an experimental unit to which I would like to pass on the following suggestion. It might be possible, in my opinion, to equip special planes with a small cannon such as are used by the whalers when they shoot out harpoons. These cannon could shoot out a type of missile which could mesh itself into the shrouds of the parachute. A winding gear could also be put into the plane so that, once the missile was actually meshed, the parachute could be towed or pulled back towards the plane. It could then be brought to earth or exploded in mid-air. Just to shoot down these parachutes would not be enough because in falling they would accomplish the very thing the Japanese are trying to do by making them explode on the ground. Some time ago, while I was conducting certain experiments, about which you know, at Sandy Hook, I saw a trial of a proposed new secret weapon which was very much on this principle. The purpose, however, was to intercept air planes and the gun was fired from the ground. It shot up an untangling device, which was attached to a steel cable, to about 3,000 feet. I am sure that the Army would recall testing this device, which might be utilized in some modified form, as I suggest. At all events, I pass this on to you for whatever it may be worth.

With very kindest regards,

Very cordially yours,

J. D. Salinger

J. Salinger

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X War Dept
X Civil Affairs Div.
X Casa

25 August 1945

Colonel William C. Chanler
Acting Director
Civil Affairs Division
War Department
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Colonel Chanler:

With reference to your letter of 13 August I have consulted with our R&A Branch concerning sending the five men requested from here to the OSS outpost at Casa. The five consultants with others similarly qualified are at present working in the Civil Affairs Division Guide program here and their loan to Casa would be at the expense of that program. Since the Guide program has, we understand, top priority over the production of prefectural manuals and directives (which we believe to be the end product at Casa) we think it would be a net loss to the whole program to send these men to Casa.

Accordingly, much as we should like to do so, we do not feel we can support General Sadler's request.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

Japan - Econ Dept + Cases

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Major General William J. Donovan

DATE: 17 August 1945

VIA: Dr. William L. Langer

FROM: Charles B. Fahs

The attached letter from Colonel William C. Chanler, Acting Director, CAD, dated 13 August 1945, requests that we make available to CASA five expert consultants from this office.

These five consultants, as well as other personnel of similar qualifications, are at present working on the CAD Guide program here and their loan to CASA would accordingly be at the expense of the Guide program.

We have always been given to understand by CAD that the Guide program held top priority over the production of prefectural manuals and directives at CASA. This was recently confirmed to me by Lt. Colonel Daniel Fahey, Far East Planning Officer, CAD. Furthermore, we have operated under the general understanding that the Guide program was related to planning at a higher level and accordingly took priority within R & A.

Attachment - 1

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15 August 1945

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

The Civil Affairs Division has received a telegram from General Hilldring, Commanding General of SHAEF, requesting support of a request by the G-5 output at SHAEF for five experts from your Washington OSS office to work directly with SHAEF's planning staff, expanding the present staff.

This staff now is charged with the responsibility for and is engaged in preparing certain end-products of planning at the direction of General Eisenhower.

In view of the urgency of this program and the shortage of qualified personnel now at SHAEF, it is hoped that you can make the above personnel available on an early date.

Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25

13 August 1945

Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

The Civil Affairs Division has received a telegram from General Sadler, Commanding General of CASA, requesting support of a request by the OSS outpost at CASA for five experts from your Washington OSS office to work directly with CASA's planning staff, augmenting the present staff.

This staff now is charged with the responsibility for and is engaged in preparing certain end-products of planning at the direction of General Crist.

In view of the urgency of this program and the shortage of qualified personnel now at CASA, it is hoped that you can make the above personnel available at an early date.

Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely yours,

W. C. Chandler

WM C. CHANDLER
Colonel, GSC
Acting Director
Civil Affairs Division

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TO : General Donovan

DATE: 6 May 1944

FROM : Japan-China Sec., FEAI

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Government in Japan in the Event of Unconditional Japanese Surrender in Near Future

1. In response to your recent question to us, I attach a memorandum from Lt. Col. Kokub, Japan Intelligence Officer, attached to this Section.

2. I agree that Civil Affairs U.S. Military Government in Japan will need considerable intelligence service by SI, whether the conquest of the Home Islands is gradual or there is immediate capitulation.

3. In either event, we recommend that if possible an SI Detachment be established with CASA as soon as possible. One officer at the beginning might be sent to handle SI dissemination and to undertake general liaison. Thereafter, it may be possible to introduce a number of SI teams attached to different regional organizations of U.S. Military Government in Japan.

[illegible]
Chief, Japan-China Sect.
For Far Eastern Division, SI

Attachment

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4 May 1945

TO: Major Duncan C. Lee

FROM: Dr. Paul E. Sokel

SUBJECT: What might happen to United States Military Government occupying Japan if Japanese Forces should surrender unconditionally

The kind of government planned for Japan by the State Department and the United States Army is not known, but it is presumed that men are being chosen for key positions when a part or all of the Japanese Empire is occupied. The CASA organization (within which R&A is functioning) is apparently attempting to work out such plans. It may also be presumed that CASA is considering the changes in their plans made necessary by Japan's surrender unconditionally before an Allied army sets foot on the Japanese main islands.

Whether Japan is occupied forcefully or the Japanese army and government capitulates unconditionally, it is believed that the intelligence job to be performed by OSS would not be very different. It does not necessarily follow that because Japan's military machine capitulates that 90 years of propaganda handed out by Japan's propaganda bureaus would be corrected in a day. There is much reason to believe that Japan's millions would not be docile in their acceptance of the hated foreigner on their soil. The people would still think of themselves as the superior race; the Emperor would still be God (or, if he is gone, the Imperial concept of a deified ruler would still be there); the island of Japan would still be sacred; and the educational system would still teach as historical fact the divine origin of land and race. An unconditional surrender would still leave the task of reindoctrinating the people with a sane and civilized social and political structure. This task could not be wholly entrusted to the Japanese.

It may be presumed, therefore, that some kind of a puppet regime would be established by the Allied armies. The Japanese understand puppet governments. They have been establishing them since they brought under their domination the Korean king in 1897. Within a puppet government composed of acceptable Japanese, Allied advisers would be stationed in every department of government with the real controls in their hands, just

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as the Japanese have done in Manchuria, Nanking and elsewhere. Each department of government would have its foreign experts.

Such an Allied government, either in this form or some other, would inevitably need expert intelligence officers in all parts of the Empire to collect and disseminate all types of information to the appropriate authorities. Such intelligence officers would report, among other things, on the attitudes of the people, sabotage, the activities of anti-foreign groups and guerrillas, smuggling, blackmarket activities, and economic and financial trends. Intelligence would furthermore be required on secret societies, the Black Dragon, blood brotherhoods, nihilists, and terrorists which will inevitably go underground and continue their nefarious activities. It is not expected that Japan will be filled with sweetness and light merely because the army has capitulated unconditionally.

Assuming these conditions to be reasonably accurate, SI agents working with MO, X2, and R&A, would be essential in large teams to cover Japan so as to keep the Allied government well informed on all conditions. The prefectural structure of Japan, each with its Allied military and political advisers, might have attached to it such intelligence units familiar with the Japanese language and local conditions. Assuming that the military government would follow this breakdown, using the Japanese political channels already set up, the OSS organization and SI in particularly, might follow the same organizational procedure thus giving national coverage on secret intelligence.

Paul E. Eckel

Paul E. Eckel
Intelligence Officer
Japan-China Sec., FESI

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TO

Duncan Lee

Have we considered the possibility of what might happen in Japan if Emperor gave himself up and ordered Japanese forces to do likewise?

D.

4/23/45

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Accession No. 4/SECT/50

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	30 MAY 19 16 10 Comments

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Japanese
Secretariat
Taylor
Edmund Taylor

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DETACHMENT 101

MH8-485/MH8-321

2 May 1945

TO : THE DIRECTOR, OSS, WASHINGTON, DC.

ATTENTION: Lt. Comdr. Edmond Taylor.

THROUGH : Major Charles Trees, CO,
AFU, Det. 101.

Dear Ed,

I hope that this catches you while you are in Washington, since a conversation which I have just had with Ena Telberg suggests that it would be very desirable for you to have a talk with Kurt Lewin, MO, Washington.

It appears that MO has done a tremendous amount of research and field work along the lines of inducing Japs to surrender. They have a number of parties known as Gold Dust Teams whose sole assignment is this. One team, consisting of Majors Hamm and Bolt, and Lt. Roger Starr, has had phenomenal success at Rhamo,--- they have converted Japs right and left, and seem to have gotten the surrender business on a mass production basis.

According to Ena, the Gold Dust Teams work on three basic principles; two of these principles correspond to our findings at Ramree: (1) the surrender message must be appropriate to the immediate tactical situation, and (2) the directions must be quite specific with regard to the mechanics of effecting surrender. Their third principle, which never occurred to us, involves the use of methods to give the Jap an excuse to his own conscience for surrendering. For example, they tell him that when he is sick or hungry, his Samurai [redacted] code can be interpreted elastically. Just how this this message was put across, Ena was unable to say, but it is apparently very effective.

If our experiences have any naval contribution to the problem, it is along the line of generalizing the communication to fit many tactical situations, and the team giving specific directions. Thus, instead of telling the Jap to go to a designated location, we told him to contact locals and [redacted] himself to be led by them to a place which would be arranged with the locals.

There is still another point which Ena didn't mention, but which the Gold Dust Teams probably work on, is that

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operate through locals. It is perfectly obvious, but worth mentioning in passing. This is the matter of taking the trouble to get a large body of locals in a cooperative mood. Their ordinary disposition is to run and hide in the jungle, and it took us some time to build up their confidence. The methods are perfectly simple---- an expressed interest in their affairs, a smile and a pat on the back, and a few Rupees.

It appears that most of the direction of the Cold Dust Teams stems directly from Dr. Kurt Lewin and his staff in Washington. I judge that most of the analysis and planning must be done there, since Ens was not familiar with the CSDIC and SEATIC reports. It seems to me that these reports, and those from the opposite number organization in the Pacific, constitute the best, and almost the only mirror of what is going on in the mind of the ordinary Jap soldier. Some of the interviewers, such as Major Nevill, have remarkably sophisticated psychological insight.

Regarding Kurt Lewin, I think it would be very profitable for you to have a talk with him. He is one of the top US psychologists, and undoubtedly knows most of the answers in this surrogate field. Over a year ago I remember that he was doing a lot of very interesting work on the Jap mind.

My present status is that the hospital is still fiddling around with my back. They took another set of X-rays yesterday, and have not yet come out with a final opinion.

Best regards,

[redacted]
Lt. A. Hairston
Lt. (jg), USNR

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DETACHMENT 101

26 April 1945

TO : Lt. Cmdr. Edmond Taylor,
Det. 404, APO 432.

FROM : Major Charles J. Trees,
OC, AFU Det. 101.

Dear Ed,

I received your radio message directed to Major Trees just before leaving Akyab; this will supplement my 30 March letter. I am in Calcutta getting a medical going-over following a minor back injury incurred in a Jeep about a month ago. It has improved somewhat, but still bothers me when I get any sort of a jolt. I am to return to the hospital tomorrow for their report.

The details regarding the Jap surrender were not particularly exciting. The local agents took our final instructions to the two Japs, and the Japs indicated agreement. These instructions were written by a local Chinaman, and specified that the Japs should accompany the locals to a clearing, remove their clothes and don some pants which we would provide, and that we would then appear and take them prisoner. Lt. McCamber, MC, brought four marines to the appointed spot, a half-mile north of Seikpyu, and located them in positions to cover the Japs from all directions. I had previously hired ten locals to beat the brush on either side of the area, just to be sure that there were no other Japs in the vicinity. The whole affair went off uneventfully according to schedule.

We probably should have gone ahead and rounded up other Japs, but a change which had been practically laid on, but several circumstances kept us from making the effort. In the first place, the Japs we got were quite uncommunicative of intelligence. Also the harbor had to leave for another job, and we were in the throes of transferring our base from Akyab town to the mainland. And there was a feeling that we might be stepping on the toes of the occupation troops, on the one hand, and also the RAF.

Just before leaving Akyab I got [illegible] letter of the above unit there. He is an old [illegible] of years' experience with the Japs. The points which he made correspondence in general those which I mentioned in my 30 March letter, and added several [illegible]

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His points were:

1. The great majority of Japs, when they see that they are in a hopeless position, will respond like anybody else to a surrender opportunity, provided they can be convinced that they will not be killed in the process. To convince them, Major Mavill believes that a straight-forward business proposition, detailed and plausible, is most appropriate.

2. It is hard to convince the Jap that he will not be shot up in the process of surrendering, because:

a. He has been told by his officers that this is our policy; and,

b. He has seen or heard about from first-hand observers, innumerable instances where Japs have been shot up while trying to give themselves up (like below for recent example of this from Col. Johnstone).

Major Mavill emphasizes the difficulty in getting Indian soldiers to cooperate in carrying out the surrender terms which might be offered to the Jap. The Indian soldier is a very simple fellow,—— he dislikes and distrusts the Jap, and takes real pleasure in shooting him. There were Brigades in the Arakan for two years who never did produce a live Jap. Mavill believes that it might be necessary to have special detachments for accepting surrender, and that the Japs might be apprised that such detachments were available.

3. Major Mavill raised a very important question which had not occurred to us, and provided the answer to it. Many of the Japs he interviews cite as the primary reason for their having delayed or avoided surrender, the fact that they could never return to their home after the war,—— that as former prisoners they would be outcasts. Therefore, when they are taken prisoner they move around, refuse to talk, and request the means to commit suicide.

Major Mavill says that CBRIG has worked out an unfail-ing answer to this; they present the following argument:

"When this war is over, either Japan will win, or the Allies will win. How let us suppose that Japan will win. She would have vast territories to populate and develop, and a shortage of manpower. She would

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Undoubtedly use you to develop and exploit these rich territories. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese who had been prisoners of the Russians became the colonists of Korea, and enjoyed wonderful opportunities (this is an historic fact which every Jap knows). Therefore, if Japan wins, you will have an excellent chance to live and prosper.

"Now, let us assume that Japan loses the war. The allies will have thousands of prisoners which they will want to send back to Japan. They will not permit any discrimination against them. Thus, whether Japan wins or loses, you, as a prisoner, will be in a favorable position."

Major Nevill says that this simple and logical argument appeals to the Jap, and turns him from a morose and uncooperative person to a happy and talkative one. He suggests that this argument be utilized as a part of the surrender appeal.

5. The Jap is unresponsive to and antagonistic toward literature which he interprets as Allied propaganda particularly if it has an emotional element. He understands and respects firm language.

A couple of evenings ago I had dinner with Col. D.D. Johnstone, GS (I), Headquarters Command. I asked him for his opinions regarding the problem. He emphasized the point that the Jap had every reason. In addition to his personal statements, Col. Johnstone believes that the Allies should make which appeared near Meiktila a fortnight ago. The British surrounded a body of Japs on a high point, and gave them some artillery treatment. A Jap officer and two men came out of the position bearing a white flag. The Japs threw down their arms. Behind the tanks was an infantry company or two, which promptly filled the three Japs with lead. Eventually it was necessary to take the high point by assault, and a considerable number of British and Indian troops were murdered. Many Japs were killed, and the rest withdrew and took prisoners. The latter swore that a number of Japs came down with the white flag fully intending to engage in the entire proceeding.

The enemy [illegible] seems to be [illegible] evidence [illegible] that the Jap [illegible] as any other human

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Subject he will take action on a straightforward business-like proposition, provided he can be convinced that we are prepared to carry out our terms of the agreement. The more we admit the mutual dangers of gunfire incidents during the process, and provide reasonable and detailed instructions whereby these dangers can be minimized, the more likely we are to get prisoners. But the Jap, like anybody else, is antagonistic to obviously phoney appeals if he sees that we are trying to stimulate his emotions or sell him a bill of goods. He will tend to suspect our proposition.

Attached is a Jap surrender leaflet picked up on Ramree, just as evidence that the Jap does some thinking on the subject of surrender. There was also one in the Maurits language, but we sent all copies of this org thru to Calcutta.

Cordially,

JAMES A. HAMILTON
1st Lt., AC, AUS

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM

14 May 1945

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Japan-China Sec., FESI

SUBJECT: Proposal of Comdr. Taylor and Lt. Hamilton for Special Japanese Surrender Teams

1. As requested, this Section has studied carefully the memorandum from Comdr. Taylor dated 18 April 1945 and the attached extract from Lt. Hamilton's letter of 20 March 1945 to Dr. Tryon. We have considered these papers with particular reference to the desirability of setting up such special surrender teams in the China Theater.

2. Our conclusions are as follows.

(a) We believe that the proposed technique can be successfully applied to China, although terrain and other conditions there may not be so favorable as the Burma jungles for the isolation of pockets of Japanese troops. Because of this fact it would seem wise to conduct the main OSS experimental work in the IBT and then to apply the results in China.

(b) In China, as you know, some work along these lines has already been done, particularly by the Northern Communists and the techniques which they have developed should undoubtedly be adopted and further developed by OSS. On this subject John Emmerson of the State Department is probably the best informed and most experienced man now in this country. We suggest that the matter be discussed further with him.

(c) As to the extent of OSS participation in this work in China now, this will largely be limited by restrictions of manpower. Such a project is obviously one for the MO Branch to carry out. SI should service with intelligence and may, to a very limited extent, gain some intelligence from POWs who are thus induced to surrender. From our point of view, however, the intelligence likely to be gained in this way promises to be so meager and of such poor quality that we would not recommend diverting any of the badly needed SI China personnel for these teams.

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3. We recommend, therefore,

(a) That the experimental program be continued in the IBT.

(b) That Comdr. Taylor and a representative of MO Branch discuss these papers thoroughly with Mr. Emmerson.

(c) That the program thus developed be conveyed to Colonel Heppner by pouch for consideration and implementation in China.

Duncan C. Lee, Maj. AUS
Chief, Japan-China Sec.,
Far East Division, SI

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Access ion No. .....

Date Rec'd SA .....

	Date	Officer's Initials	Comments

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SOUTH EAST ASIA

Japanese
X Surrender
X Taylor, E.S.
X Hamilton, James

Registry No. MH5-106
18 April 1945

Dear General,

I am attaching some excerpts from a memorandum written by my special assistant, Jim Hamilton, to Mr. Tryon dealing with the question of Jap surrender attitudes. It seems to me that this report throws some new light on a very obscure subject and it may suggest a worthwhile project for OSS to undertake.

As you know, I have always been keenly interested in the problem of getting Japs to surrender and have tried to keep abreast of the available literature on the subject. From what I have read it seems to me that this problem has never been properly tackled and I feel very strongly that OSS could make a very important contribution by concentrating some effort on this task. Hamilton's approach to the problem seems to me the most promising line yet developed. Basically it seems to me that what he has done is to use SI methods to collect specific information about a particular group of Jap soldiers who find themselves in a hopeless military situation and then to try to reach them through underground agents with simple surrender messages.

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The great merit of this approach, it seems to me, is that it concentrates on trying to discover the attitude of the Japs toward the immediate issue of surrender in a concrete situation instead of exploring Jap attitudes to the general idea of surrender. I think there is a very good chance that if Hamilton keeps plugging away along this line, he will eventually develop a practical formula for getting Japs caught in a hopeless situation to surrender wherever they may be.

I am sending instructions to Hamilton to push this as energetically as possible, but I would also like to go beyond that and propose to you a systematic extension of this experiment.

My recommendation is that a special mobile unit consisting of four or five properly qualified individuals be set up to do field research and experimentation along the line already started by Hamilton. Ideally, this unit should be authorized to work both in SEAC and China Theaters, with an eventual field aim of producing sufficiently important results to sell MacArthur or Nimitz on the idea of establishing a similar team in the Pacific.

This special team, according to my idea, should collaborate closely with MO, SI and R&A and should be authorized

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organize or direct small scale experimental operations along the lines Hamilton has already started whenever and wherever local detachment commanders are willing to let them operate. Since these operations would usually be in areas that have already been partially overrun by our forces and were not therefore very important in terms of classic OSS operations, I feel that the detachment commanders would seldom, if ever, object to them, provided their ultimate responsibility for their respective areas were clearly acknowledged.

If this idea seems worthwhile to you and if other considerations permit, I would like to propose myself to form and direct the special team recommended above. I do feel that I have almost unique qualifications in OSS for this sort of work since my experience has been about equally divided between intelligence and psychological warfare.

I have not had an opportunity to discuss this proposal with Colonel Coughlin yet and do not know how he would feel about releasing me from my present duties to concentrate on this project. Naturally if he felt this were undesirable from the over-all point of view, I would not care to push my proposal, but I believe that as far as the China Burma Theater is concerned I could get the activity started within the framework of my present duties and then on the basis of

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the initial results it could be determined whether it would be worthwhile to put me on this project on a full time basis. Naturally, this is all dependent upon what you think of the proposal in general. Even if you do like it, I do not think it would be necessary to set the thing up as a formal project immediately since we can accomplish a great deal under the existing set-up in this theater. Actually for the purposes of this project, the India Burma Theater, with the possible exception of the Southwest Pacific, is the best field of all since the current campaign in Burma will certainly leave large pockets of Japs behind. More prisoners are probably available in China, but in my opinion more useful information will be obtained from trying to work on small groups of demoralized, but still uncaptured, Japs.

I would also like to point out that if we can begin to produce any interesting results, it will give OSS activity in this theater a new lease on life and constitute an important additional justification for our presence here. The situation in Burma is very similar in many ways to the situation in the Pacific, particularly the Southwest Pacific, and there is a strong likelihood that any practical information about Jap surrender attitudes discovered here will be equally

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valid in the Pacific and will facilitate the formidable task of mopping up by-passed groups of Japs in that theater.

Sincerely,

E. L. Taylor

E. L. TAYLOR
Lt. Commander, USNR

Major General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

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EXTRACT

LETTER FROM LT. JAMES HAMILTON TO DR. ROBERT C. TRYON

30 MARCH 1945

* * * * * * * * * * *

Along about 26 February, after hearing all sorts of stories of begging, starving and thirsty Japs, it suddenly occurred to me that this was the laboratory situation to try out some of the ideas which we were germinating in Central Building. Specifically,---given proper circumstances and opportunities, could the Jap be persuaded to surrender? I got off a message to Fit Tysbergh (later it developed that Lt. Avedon was in charge of MO), requesting "a large number of posters telling Japs that their position was hopeless, and that they could surrender and get food by stripping off their clothes and arms and sitting in any open paddy field.

Three days later, Lt. Avedon brought down 8 posters along these lines, expressed considerable interest in the idea, and went back to Akyab to get a lot of posters and leaflets done. The project had never been defined as an operation nor had it been cleared, and up to this point we had been hesitant to bring it up to the British, since they had already had some reason to consider us a bit "irregular". We paved the way on 1 March with a few drinks, and on 2 March I popped the question to the Brigade Major of 36th. His reaction was much more favorable than I had anticipated,---"Hell, yes, it probably will not work, but there can be no harm trying."

The following morning General Lomax, CO of the 26th Div., (36 and 71 Brigade) dropped in at Ramree town. The Brigade Major mentioned the matter to Gen. Lomax somewhat as follows: "These Americans have suggested that some Japs might be persuaded to surrender by a leaflet or some such thing."

The General went for the idea in a Big way, sat down immediately and started to work on what should be said. He was so excited in planning the thing that the Brigade officers didn't get a chance to say that they had undertaken to produce posters and leaflets. After a half-hour, he cancelled all luncheon engagement and flew off to Akyab. Actually he did some good, for by the 6th his leaflets were in Ramree Town, some were dropped by plane and some were sent out with patrols.

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General Lomax' instructions were quite different from ours. — he told the Japs to contact any village headman and arrange a rendezvous through the latter. Also, he had a leaflet done in Burmese to inform the villagers.

Meanwhile, the OSS posters and leaflets didn't come through. Apparently there was a slip-up in transportation from Akyab, and we didn't have them at Ramree Town until the 12th. Then I tried to sell them to Brigade, but they didn't accept, citing three reasons: (1) the instructions and Mandated General Lomax' leaflet, (2) they were too vague and flowery (Brigade said), and (3) they didn't give the Jap assurance that a method had been worked out to effect surrender without bloodshed. So the whole shot was Lomax', although he is aware of the fact that it was an OSS suggestion.

As for the results: As I have indicated earlier, neither OSS nor SIS had anyone [illegible] south of Ramree Island, nor yet [illegible] until very late. Frontier Force Rifles were at Kyaukpyu, and the rest were various units of the Indian Army.

We were completely [illegible] the last few days [illegible] then two agents we had sent [illegible] Kyaukpyu [illegible] Kyaukpyu [illegible] patrol near Kyaukpyu [illegible] final landing for front [illegible] the boundary, and asked [illegible] Jap [illegible] Jap. That evening [illegible] in Kyaukpyu. Shortly [illegible] the house to see him, and [illegible] Brigade and determined [illegible] eight killed, including [illegible] most of [illegible] members he had seen [illegible] Kyaukpyu [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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to the Japs. He reported the following: One group of [illegible] and [illegible] wounded officer were very favorably inclined toward [illegible] proposal, but they were greatly worried about being shot in the process by Indian soldiers (who, as is well known, rarely take prisoners). The Japs expressed a wish that the surrender might be made to a British unit. The other group, consisting of nineteen men and one officer, were nineteen-to-one in favor, expressing similar sentiments about the Indians. Their officer, unwounded, was not favorably inclined, but he permitted discussion of surrender. Throughout both groups, the principal topic of discussion was fear of betrayal by the Indian soldiers.

Unfortunately, we got information regarding the episode two days late. A Burma Intelligence Corps officer went down and contacted the boy, verified the story, but learned that the Japs had been scared away from their former hide-out by an Indian patrol, -- part of a sweep across the island.

About a week later a single Jap near Kyaukthanke was brought to an Indian patrol by Burmese who had been approached by the Jap bearing one of General Lomax' leaflets.

I returned yesterday from the mainland last evening to hear that during my absence one of my pets, one of the jungle folk from Yanthitahe 5 miles north of here, came down four days ago after lining up 3 Japs who had leaflets and wanted to surrender. In the absence of me and my interpreter, the little fellow was afraid to contact anybody else, and returned to Yanthitahe. This morning another informant from Saikpya, a mile north of Yanthitahe, reported that two Japs were anxious to surrender, but were afraid to do so to the Indian troops. Whether these two are part of the Yanthitahe party or not, I don't know. I got the local Chinaman to write a cordial note to the Japs, giving specific instructions for them to follow the locals to a rendezvous, take off clothes and arms, put on clothes we provide, and meet us at a second rendezvous. Also am sending a package of Chesterfields to demonstrate good faith. Will let you know later in the letter how we came out.

With at least one Jap in irons, and two in the hope chest, and a history of others who might have been corralled had it not been for delayed communications, I would like to propose some tentative conclusions:

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1. Given proper circumstances and incentives, the Jap will express a desire to surrender; the majority will not express preference to die a hero's death, when they see that their chances for military success are slim.

2. When the Jap is in a difficult or impossible situation, the most important items to be conveyed are:

a. Assurance that they will not be tricked and shot up.

b. Specific, clear, logical and fairly safe steps which they may take to carry out the terms of surrender.

Regarding a, above, neither Lomax' leaflet nor our efforts recognized flat-footedly the possibility of our trickery, and denied it. I am inclined to think that such a frank statement is to be preferred to flowery phrases aimed toward establishment of a "mood"; the mood is already there or the Jap wouldn't be considering surrender. What he needs is a good business proposition.

Regarding b, above, neither the "undress and disarm in a paddy field", nor "arrange a rendezvous through a village headman" is sufficiently concrete. Under very special circumstances, one could work out a proposal for a specific attempt, i.e., go to such-and-such a hill, clearing or beach. This could be done only if Japanese writers and reproduction machinery were always on hand, -- obviously a rare situation.

I have been trying to think up a sort of universal formula, -- concrete, convincing and practicable. Following is the best I can work out at the moment, and it is substantially the task I have used in my letter to the two Japs:

1. You are outnumbered and disorganized, and your leaders have abandoned you.

2. If you want to live, we will give you an opportunity to surrender. You have been told that we torture and kill prisoners. This is untrue. We treat prisoners strictly according to international law. -- They receive good food, medical attention and cigarettes. We have many Japanese prisoners who are happy to be free of the horrors of war.

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3. If you want to surrender, you must follow our instructions carefully. If you follow the directions we can be certain that you will not trick us. Follow the directions and you will be safe.

4. (a) Tell a native that you want to surrender.

(b) Tell the native to inform the headman of the village that you want to surrender.

(c) Ask the headman to inform American (British) troops of this.

(d) Ask the headman to leave one native with the American troops. This native will act as a messenger.

(e) The headman will return to you with a group of natives twice your number.

(f) You will give the headman all of your weapons, -- rifles, grenades and knives. Make a list of all the weapons you give him. Later on we will ask you to give us the list, so that we may recover all of the weapons.

(g) The headman will return to his village, leaving the rest of the natives with you.

(h) The messenger who was left with the Americans will return to the village and tell the headman where he is to bring you.

(i) The headman will lead you to the place which we will designate as Rendezvous #1.

(j) Go with the Headman, with natives in front and behind you.

(k) Walk slowly, do not run or make quick movements. Keep together in a group. Keep your hands above your head.

(l) The messenger will tell you to stop when you reach Rendezvous #1. You will not meet us at this Rendezvous, but one of us will be watching you.

(m) Each man will remove all his clothes at Rendezvous #1, and walk naked 30 feet to a pile of clothes which we will provide, and put on these clothes. Do not carry anything with you when you walk to the clothes which we provide.

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(n) Wait until the messenger comes to tell you where you are to go to Rendezvous #2.

(o) Go to Rendezvous #2 in a group surrounded by natives. You will come with weapons to this Rendezvous! One at a time you will advance to us and surrender. We will not (raise our weapons and) fire unless you engage in hostile action or attempt to run away.

The above instructions are necessarily complicated because we want to effect surrender smoothly and without danger to you or to us. Follow the instructions carefully and you will receive food, medical attention, and cigarettes.

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16,966 B

Japanese
X 2 Intercepts
X FBIS
X FCC

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 5 September 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: H. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Notes on FCC/FBIS Intercepts

Enclosed are copies of Mr. Langford's notes on FCC/FBIS intercepts dated August 31-September 1-2, and September 4-5 1945.

Enclosures

NOTE: This will be the last of Mr. Langford's comments on intercepts, except for such additional ones as he may prepare in the midst of his other duties in his new position.

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SAMPLE

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

August 31-September 1-2, 1945

[redacted]

Continued

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

[redacted]

OI

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

September 4-5, 1945

The U.S. public will probably react to the speech of Premier Higashikuni with disgust or consider it so absurd as to be laughable. However, it is typically Japanese and is their usual method of minimizing any defeat or humiliation which may befall them.

The introduction of his speech takes great care to explain that the evil of the war was brought about entirely by command of the Emperor. No indemnities is given here of defeat. Following the introduction is a reasonably fair account of the actual reasons for the surrender of Japan.

Probably the principal reason for the introductory is to "save face". In addition, it would not be considered good policy to have the Japanese people know the actual facts, because they were told, up to the time of the announcement that the war had ended, that Japan was near to victory.

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Elaborate plans are being made concerning education, particularly the study of science and chemistry. The whole aim is militaristic, especially for this end it is likely that much money will be expended in the future to perfect it. It is almost certain that Japanese leaders have already begun plans for the continuation of the war and it may be expected that in the future Japan will be a world war faction adherent. They will be equally treated with the hope that they will learn their knowledge in the super Japanese schools.

[redacted]

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16,366

Japanese

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 4 September 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Harris Smith, Cmdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Notes on PEC/JNAF Intercepts

Enclosed is copy of Mr. Langdon's notes on PEC-JNAF intercepts dated 3 September 1945.

R. Harris Smith Jr

Enclosure

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DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area
GENERAL NOTES

OF

FCC/FBIS INTERCEPTS

3 September 1945

The omission in today's broadcasts of any reference to the treatment by the Japanese of allied prisoners of war is very striking. It is doubtful if the Japanese people realize the importance of this matter. Extreme cruelty to prisoners is accepted as a natural consequence and what knowledge the general public possessed of the treatment of war prisoners is not likely to have impressed them to any extent. However, in spite of the many public statements to the effect that the people are to be fully informed in regard to events, it is quite evident the reactions of the Allies to reports on the prison camps is being scrupulously kept from the Japanese people.

The official Japanese attitude toward missionaries has completely reversed. The beginning of the war plans were made to prevent their return at the end of the war. They are now to be welcomed and no attempt is made to conceal the fact that it is expected that they will use their influence toward easing the surrender terms and in securing concessions of various sorts.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1. T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 30 August 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
Dir Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Notes on FCC/ONI Intercepts

Enclosed are copies of Mr. Langford's notes on FCC/ONI Intercepts dated 28 and 29 August 1945.

Enclosure 2

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FCC/FBIS INTERCEPTS CONFIDENTIAL

28 August 1945

The Mainichi made a surprising statement today, saying that it had in the past been Japanese policy to bully the weak and submit to the great. It advised a change of policy as Japan is now among the weak.

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The speech of Lt. General Ishikawa was also surprising because of his statement that the military brought on the present disaster. Such a statement may be the natural reaction of the Japanese to defeat. In minor matters, such as athletics and political and other organizations, a defeat is invariably followed by a quarrel amongst themselves and frequently in dissolution.

The statement of the Asahi, that Japan is a defeated nation and that she must not make the mistake of Germany after War I of preparing for revenge and for the next war, may be a hint to those who may be planning such a future.

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The Honolulu broadcast yesterday stated that Japanese are to be seen standing shoulder to shoulder on the white beaches of Sagami Bay watching the great invading fleet. This is rather amusing because all beaches in that part of Japan are of black sand. Also visibility is so poor at this season that war ships would not approach close enough to land for people to be seen even with powerful glasses.

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Mr. Longford has no comments for the 27th of August 1945.

No-117

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FREE INTERCEPTS

CONFIDENTIAL

29 August 1945

The Japanese newspapers are becoming increasingly outspoken. The article in the "Yomiuri-Hochi" is an outstanding example.

Under the heading "Publish the Truth", the paper tells of the deception and confusion which was practiced during the war in regard to giving out information. It calls attention to the great shock to the people when told of Japanese surrender.

The facts are correct but publication of the facts is most unusual in Japan.

This may indicate a change in Japanese policy or it may be in keeping with a plan to cultivate favor with the occupation forces and to lessen suspicion of Japanese action to give an underground movement a better chance to thrive.

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No comments will be made on broadcasts of 30 August 1945.

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

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Japanese Intercepts

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 24 August 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Notes on FCC/FBIS Intercepts

Enclosed are Mr. Langford's notes on intercepts dated as follows:

9 to 17 August 1945
20 August 1945
22 August 1945
23 August 1945
24 August 1945
25 August 1945
26 August 1945

Enclosure

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FROM

OFFICE OF [illegible] OF NAVY

General Notes on FCC/FBIS

Intercepts - Period 9 to 17 August 1945

The Japanese Surrender

Japan declared that the Atomic bomb and Russia's entry into the war influenced the Emperor in his decision to call a truce, which apparently is identical with her reaction to the arrival of Perry.

Undoubtedly the government was well aware that defeat was inevitable before the bomb attacks or the Russian declaration of war, but were unable to find a good excuse for surrender.

When Perry arrived the frank admission was made that "Japan is unable to cope with the mechanical power of the hairy barbarians; therefore, we must make friends with them and make every effort to acquire their knowledge."

Now it is the same story. Japan has not the ability to withstand the assaults of superior weapons. The people are instructed to cooperate with the invader and to begin a new way of life. However, it is probable that they have been instructed to plan for the continuation of the war in the future.

It is likely that invasion will be assisted in every way by the people, but that requests for leniency and special concessions will be continuous. The fact that the people were told that the surrender was solely the will of the Emperor and no hint given that he was compelled to surrender probably indicates that there is no sincere desire for a change in policy.

An example of Japanese persistence in the matter of "perpetual lease" in place of outright ownership by foreigners. That arrangement was made to save the Japanese humiliation. However, steps were at once taken to abolish "perpetual lease" and at the time of the earthquake they finally succeeded.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
[illegible] Area

.....

We may expect the same tactics to begin in regard to the present invasion. Already daily requests are being made for concessions or for the easing of certain of the surrender terms.

For the sake of the future it would probably be the best policy to be unyielding; and to compel the fulfillment to the letter of all surrender terms.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

Notes on FCC/FBIS Intercepts

August 19, 1945

Some of the Japanese newspapers, particularly the Asahi, are extremely outspoken in regard to the present situation in Japan and openly comment on Japan's past mistakes.

This may be genuine but there is a possibility that it is part of the plan to cultivate the goodwill of the invaders. The Asahi, however, has frequently been in trouble in the past for its outspoken statements regarding conditions in Japan.

The Mainichi has always been intensely nationalistic and statements from this paper are likely to be insincere.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Notes on FCC/WBIS Intercepts

August 22, 1945

The speech of Higashikuni calling upon the people to "promote militaristic and racial spirits" may have significance. It is possible that the Japanese people have been told to prepare for the next war.

Radio broadcasts are now giving details of the damage caused by air raids. Before the fighting ceased, the reports were invariably that little or no damage was caused. This reversal of policy may be for the purpose of attempting to gain the sympathy of the invaders but it is also partly a matter of "saving face." Evidently the people are to be told that they were helpless against the tremendous power of the U.S.

Apparently there is confusion among the members of the Dai Nippon Political society. Previous reports that it had decided to disband do not exactly agree with today's broadcast. However, it is possible that they do not intend to disband until the end of the special Diet session, which is scheduled to take place in the near future.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Facsimile

Notes on JCC/PWIS Interrogate

August 23, 1945

The Japanese people are informed that "Contacts are expected to be many between the occupation forces and civilians."

It has previously been the opposite of this. People were instructed to avoid foreigners and the police frequently called up for questioning Japanese who fraternized with foreigners. The people may have some difficulty in getting accustomed to the change.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

August 24, 1945

Complaints to General MacArthur are becoming more frequent regarding the actions of the Chinese and Russians. They probably have a double purpose: to create, if possible, dissention among the allies; and, to attempt to create sympathy.

* * * * * *

The Japanese government is hoping that Japanese people in Formosa, Korea, and other occupied areas will be left undisturbed. It is likely that much will be said about this in the future. At present Japanese have complete economic control in these areas and if this can be maintained it will be but a short time until they will be agitating for return to Japan.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FMIS INTERCEPTS

25 August 1945

Japan is already beginning her campaign to work on the sympathy of the U. S. Today's broadcast tells of the suffering which the Japanese have endured and professes great satisfaction that the people of the U. S. were spared. At the same time giving a veiled hint that Japan was not defeated but the surrender was in obedience to the Imperial command.

The "Nippon Times" may be the official organ of the Japanese government. The newspaper at the outbreak of the war and statements made by the "Times" in recent weeks have been very close to later government actions.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FEIS INTERCEPTS

26 August 1945

The Dai Nippon Political Association has not yet dissolved. Today's broadcast reports that the dissolution will take place. This may be a matter of necessity because the D.N.P.A. is the Diet. However, the actions of this organization after the closing of the Diet will bear watching. The leaders are not of the type to surrender without a struggle and it is possible that they plan to go "underground."

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DFS
JJK

I wonder if it would be of use to Secretary of State.

One never knows what is shown to him.

JJD

Mr. O'Donnell File

57-M-45

Director's Office

OSS Form 95a
(3-46)

31 Aug

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Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

HONOLULU 1, T. H.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 22 August 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Notes on FCC/WNRS Intercepts

You will recall that we sent to you under date of 21 August notes prepared by Mr. Langford on FCC/WNRS intercepts for the last several days since the commencement of peace negotiations.

We enclose herewith additional notes prepared by this gentleman dated 21 August 1945 since they might possibly be of interest to you.

Enclosure (2 pages)

P.S. - Also enclosed are Mr. Langford's notes for the August 14 - 19 intercepts.

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

[redacted] NEWS

OF

FCC/ERIS EXCERPTS

21 August 1945

Judging from radio broadcasts the Japanese government is hoping to secure food supplies from the occupation forces. It is likely that much will be said in regard to the food situation during the coming month.

- - - -

The statement of novelist Kan Kikuchi to the effect that Japan has much to learn from foreign countries would seem that he has changed his mind in recent years. In 1938 Kikuchi stated, at a public banquet for outstanding students, that the practice of sending students abroad was a grievous waste of time and money; that the West had nothing to offer the Japanese in the way of culture or learning of any sort. He also declared that the time had arrived for the West to come to Japan to acquire learning and culture.

Kikuchi's recent statement possibly reflects the ideas of many Japanese educated men. Such statements show a similarity in reaction of the Japanese mind at the time of Perry's landing to the present situation. They save their pride by admitting that the "foreign barbarians" have knowledge which surpasses that of the Japanese. As a consequence their friendship must be cultivated and every effort made to acquire that knowledge. The frequent statements regarding the study

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of autumn is probably an indication of the truth of this policy.

- - - -

The frequent instructions to the people regarding the treatment of returning soldiers and the incident of unmilitary treatment of officers gives an insight into the real feeling of the Japanese people for the military.

As individuals, the Japanese people detest the military, particularly the high-ranking army officers, but it is seldom that one has the courage to even hint at his feeling in that respect.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

Notes on FCC/MIS Intercepts

August 18 - 19, 1945

The dissolution of the Dai Nippon Political Association which has been taking place may actually be preparation to go underground.

The men behind this association are almost certainly the men who planned the war and have had control of affairs. They are not of the type who submit easily and it would be in keeping with Japanese practice for them to outwardly disband but actually to make a desperate attempt to retain their control.

The formation of the new political parties is apparently the plan of the D.N.P.A. and it is difficult to understand how it could be possible for them to designate the new political parties unless plans have been made to control them all.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to preparations for the intensive study of science, emphasis is given to the study of Japanese history.

This may mean that history must be remade to fit present conditions and, in some manner, be presented in such fashion as to save the humiliation of the present defeat.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The admission that Japan has failed in her efforts to control Asia by force and the suggestion that efforts must now be made to accomplish the end by means of culture may be an indication that plans are already in the making for a new effort, to obtain their former power and influence.

Instructions to the people regarding their behavior toward the invaders probably indicate that it is the intention to curry favor and gain sympathy. If this plan succeeds the underground movement will have more chance of success.

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(NOTE: These comments on broadcasts of the 18th-19th will be supplemented later with regard to broadcasts of the succeeding three days which provide a more inclusive viewpoint to judge all broadcasts during the period August 18 to 22, inclusive.)

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+ Thelevan 6 x 722
x FBIS

13 August 1941

SUBJECT: Authorization to Release Discarded Copies of FBIS Intercepts to University of Hawaii

TO: Commander H. Davis Maxwell, USN

With reference to your memorandum of 10 May 1941 requesting approval for the release of certain discarded copies of FBIS intercepts to the University of Hawaii, [illegible] General Counsel has [illegible] has any objection to your taking such action, and you are hereby authorized to effect such a release accordingly.

[illegible] J. DONOVAN
[illegible]
[illegible]

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OSS Form 36010

DATE 4/14/45

TO: Lt. Pritzell

If as there are extra copies and not original records, there is no legal objection to our releasing them to the Univ. of Hawaii.

See Col Nicholson's note to me - FCC has no objection.

J. McManus

Office of the General Counsel

Out of Card file C (42938)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f 6.3

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OSS Form [illegible] DATE [illegible]

TO: Mr. L. R. Schoemer

There is no objection on our part or the part of FCC to this procedure.

S. G. Nicholson
Lt. Comdr., USNR

FROM: EXT.

(72816)

Outside Edg
Dots indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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DATE 11 Aug.

TO: Lt Col Nicholson

1. Would we have any objection to giving these intercepts away as requested?

2 Would FCC object? [redacted] should we clear with them?

JFFehrenbach

AUG 13 1945

Office of the General Counsel

Out [redacted] (42934)

Cuts indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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I think that the attached question of discarded copies of MIS intercepts should be cleared with Connell.

WJD

7/24/45
Director's Office

OSS Form 3034
(Style)

Out
circle indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 19 July 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Discarded copies FBIS intercepts - request for approval of storage at War Records Division, University of Hawaii, and request for eventual release to the University of Hawaii.

As may be recollected, when the writer arrived in Honolulu in 1944 he found that the MAA office had been using as one of their major sources of raw material the FBIS intercepts which at that time were being received substantially from FCC in Portland, Oregon.

After working over this material, previous to late 1943, it was deposited in the War Records Division of the University of Hawaii with the understanding that it would not be utilized by the University until the end of the war.

During 1944 and 1945 MAA continued to receive a vastly increasing number of these intercepts. In the latter period the major volume originated from FBIS intercepts at Guam and Kwajen and delivered to us by the FBIS teletype at 1134 Bishop Street.

As this volume continued to mount, storage of stale intercepts presented a greater and greater problem as time went on and it was necessary to find additional storage space for this material.

The writer arranged with Dr. Gregg M. Sinclair, President of the University of Hawaii, to accept delivery of some 20 current cartons material [illegible] for the period of late 1943 up to and including Dec. 1945.

This material was [illegible] delivered against the attached receipt [illegible] Librarian.

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General Donovan

Subject: FBIS Intercepts - storage and release of

19 July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

The informal arrangement with Dr. Sinclair is covered by our letter to him dated 12 July 1945, copy of which is attached.

We also enclose packing list and case identification numbers covering this material.

Your favorable action on the subject expressed to Dr. Sinclair, viz., that this material be released to the University upon the close of the war, is solicited.

None of this material is classified, as you will recognize the FBIS intercepts have substantially become public property by virtue of their incremental release by FBIS/OCB, CINCPAC, CINCPOA, etc., to the press.

Whether actual title of these papers rests in FBIS or OSS we do not know, but undoubtedly this is a matter of minor consequence.

Enclosures: Signed receipt by Librarian, U. of K., dtd 11 July 45
Our packing list dtd 12 July 45 covering 20 cartons
Our ltr to Dr. Sinclair, U. of K., dtd 12 July 45

cc: Mrs. Willoughby C. Hanly, Exec Mbl

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FBIS intercept copies

12 July, 1945

Rules Of The Material In Cartons Stored At The University of Hawaii.

1. # 201- April 9-30, May 1-30, 1945.

2. # 202- Feb. 28-29, Mar. 1-31, April 1-8, 1945.

3. # 203- Dec. 17-31, 1944. Jan. 1-31 and Feb. 1-21, 1945.

4. # 204- Nov. 1-30, Dec. 1-16, 1944.

5. # 205- Sept. 8-30, Oct. 1-31, 1944.

6. # 206- Aug. 1-31, Sept. 1-7, 1944.

7. # 207 Feb. 1944. June 30, April 24, Oct. 27, Oct. 11, 1943.

8. # 208 Aug. 1-30, Oct. 1-13, 1943.

9. # 209 Sept. 1-29, June 13-30, 1943.

10. # 210 June 7-30, 1944.

11. # 211 June 7-July 9, 1944.

12. # 212 November 3-31, 1943

13. # 213 June 1-14, July 1-31, 1943.

14. # 214 April 17-30, Feb. 1-7, Jan. 1-31, 1943.

15. # 215 April 1-16, May 1-31, July 16, and July 26, 1943.

16. # 216 April 1-30, June 1-6, 1944.

17. # 217 May 1-31, 1944.

18. # 218 March 1-31, 1944.

19. # 219 January 1-31, 1944. Memorandum relating to U.S. prisoners, 1942. Clippings- Political & Economic, July 1-31, 1944.

20. # 220 October and November, 1943.

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12 July 1945

Dr. Irwin A. Stuckslr
President, University of Hawaii
Honolulu, T. H.

My dear Dr. Stuckslr:

Confirming the writer's conversation with you several days ago, we have delivered to your representative against receipt 23 corrugated cartons, stamped and sealed, of material from our Research and Analysis Branch in the Castle & Cooke Building, which we understand you will store at the University of Hawaii campus until the end of the war.

At that time it is hoped the Director of the Office of Strategic Services will be able to release this material to the University of Hawaii for inclusion in your War Records Division.

Yours very truly,

R. DAVIS RUSSELL, Comdr., USNR
Strategic Services Officer, Pac

Duplicate original of the receipt from University of Hawaii for the above-mentioned 23 cartons has been delivered to Cook Estate, Limited, there signatures appear on the receipt.

RRRichmond
Encl: Copy of Mrs. Williamina C. Bixby
Receipt dtd

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Japanese
x Intercepts
x FCC

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU I. T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
x FBIS

DATE: 21 August 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Mr. Langford's Comments on FCC Broadcasts

For some months this gentleman has been going over the daily FBIS file, providing notes which we understand have been helpful to MO program origination on the Pacific Coast and also, we understand from Mr. Wilson, they have proved valuable to other recipients in Washington.

This gentleman's remarks on what the Japanese are betraying since the peace negotiations have started might be of interest to you, and I enclose copy of comments embracing this period.

Enclosure - 10 sheets

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FMS INTERCEPTS

20 August 1945

The resignation of nine members of the Cabinet Advisory Board may have significance. This may become clearer when the names of the new members are announced.

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The unofficial statement that Japan expects to pay indemnity does not coincide well with the official statement that the armistice is the initiative of the Japanese.

However, being unofficial, it is not likely that much attention will be paid to it by the general public.

This is the usual Japanese method of breaking bad news. A defeat is never admitted at the time but at some later date it will be mentioned as if the details were well known. This was very noticeable in connection with the loss of Okinawa.

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Shigemitsu's blunt statement that Japan has been defeated is a characteristic of the man. He made similar statements when in office previous to the war and this made him extremely unpopular with many Japanese officials.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FCC/FBIS INTERCEPTS

17 August 1945

Certain features of today's broadcast appear significant and may have much importance concerning the future of Japan.

According to this, Japan is to continue in control of all domestic affairs, the decision to stop fighting is entirely the decision of Japan. The inference being that the Atomic Bomb and the entrance of Russia into the war are causing, for the present, needless loss of life and that a truce has been declared during which time measures will be devised to cope with them.

The emphasis placed upon education, particularly the study of chemistry probably is what is uppermost among the plans for meeting the new threats, i.e. Japan can also invent an atomic bomb.

The delays in meeting the terms of the surrender are probably a scheme to gain time in which to prepare the people for what is to come and to inform them regarding their future actions. Instructions sent out before military control is established will be obeyed to a much greater extent than when it is known that "Foreign barbarians" are dictating to the throne.

There appears to be a great similarity to the reactions that took place at the time of Perry's invasion and it is possible that present day Japan will follow the same path as she did at that time, that is, she will outwardly cultivate the friendship of the U. S. and learn nothing undue to acquire our knowledge of the implements of warfare and, if possible, acquire the means to produce them.

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The statement that fighting has stopped because of the bomb and the entry of Russia into the war probably shows that this is an excellent chance to 'save face'.

The slogan "100 years of war" has probably still the same importance in their minds and that plans are now being made to achieve that end.

The broadcast makes no mention of defeat and gives no hint that a foreign power is about to take control but warns of difficult times ahead.

It is probably that the Japanese people are convinced that the Emperor is order to save further loss of life and to lessen present hardships (The people are almost certainly near to starvation and almost naked) in order to make preparations to resume the war, even though it may require 100 years. No one will even suspect that the country is defeated and bankrupt.

All instructions will be carried out, regardless of the humiliation and hardship involved, but all will patiently await the time for revenge.

It would seem that the decision to leave the Emperor in control is a very wise one. Personally, he is but a symbol but the fact that the people have been trained, since the beginning of history, to place obedience to the Emperor above all else, will be reasonable assurance that they will continue to obey regardless of the power that is behind him. To have overthrown the Emperor would have resulted in chaos.

It is probably then the great danger for the future will be relaxation of vigilance and the slow but sure regaining of the power to again make war, even though it be 100 years in the future.

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General Notes on FCC/FBIS Intercepts.

Unless unforeseen events complicate matters it is likely [illegible] will outwardly be docile, obedient and most friendly and [illegible] great danger. Many people in the U. S. should the Japanese [illegible] way, will exert pressure to have control relaxed.

It is possible that the men who sign the peace treaty will [illegible] hird immediately after. This will make them national heroes and the [illegible] strengthen the resolve to carry on the war.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area
GENERAL NOTES
on
FCC/FBIS INTERCEPTS

16,17,18 August 1945

The broadcasts of the past few days may be a very good indication of the course Japan has decided to follow.

The statement that the war's end is but an emergency stage and the instructions to build a strong national structure may suggest that instructions have been given to the local authorities to have the people plan for a future continuance of the war. This will avoid the humiliation of actual surrender and at the same time render it easier to have continued obedience.

The numerous delays in carrying out instructions regarding the signing of peace terms may be for the purpose of gaining time in which to give instructions to the people concerning their future actions. (These instructions are not likely to be heard over the radio.)

The statement in the Imperial Rescript, "Continuance of the war will endanger our national structure", may be significant. It would seem to be a declaration that plans are being made to carry on the war sometime in the future.

Apparently it will be the present policy of the government to submit to all orders willingly and to carry out a policy of appeasement. By following this policy they probably hope to retain greater control over domestic affairs.

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Also this apparent docility will be expected to aid in obtaining the innumerable concessions which are almost certain to be sought.

It is likely that the Japanese expect by this means to secure the sympathy and aid of U. S. missionaries in getting greater control over domestic affairs.

The frequent references to, "The reconstruction of Japan," would seem to indicate that there is still hope of retaining a great measure of independence.

Nothing in the broadcasts, to date, has indicated that Japan has been forced to surrender, but, to the contrary, that the whole scheme is Japanese.

The Japanese people undoubtedly have this impression and are convinced the present action is but a truce.

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FCC/FEIS EXCERPTS

14, 15, 16 August 1945

The news broadcasts regarding the surrender of Japan are unusually frank in admitting defeat while stressing the point that the decision to stop hostilities is entirely a Japanese matter.

The Japanese people have probably received instructions, through official channels and not by radio, as to their future actions when the time comes for the occupation forces to land.

A brief reference to "revenge" in the domestic broadcast may give a hint as to the nature of the instructions.

The story of the "47 RONIN" is considered by the Japanese as worthy of the emulation of all true Japanese.

The exhortation to unity and to greater efforts in regard to scientific knowledge may indicate that the people have been advised to emulate the "47 RONIN" and strive to come out victorious when the war is resumed.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FEBA INTERCEPTS

9 August 1945

It is not likely that the Atomic Bomb or the Russian declaration of war will lower the morale of the Japanese people. On the contrary these events may result in even greater effort to carry on the fight.

The military authorities and the government undoubtedly have a perfect understanding of the inevitable consequences.

There is some possibility of an epidemic of "hara kiri" among them and this would be a very good indication that they are prepared to surrender.

If this should happen it is almost certain that a final effort will be made to receive some modification of the terms of surrender which will enable Japan to "save face".

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[redacted] SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area
GENERAL NOTES

ON

FOO/FRUS INTERCEPTS

8 August 1945

Statement concerning Stalin:

The events following this statement may indicate the measure of surprise caused by the declaration of war and that Japanese authorities had begun to have confidence that the danger of war had lessened greatly.

It is not likely that any reference will be made to this statement in the future but increasing complaints will be made of the Russians perfidy in disregarding treaties.

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FROM
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Pacific Ocean Area

GENERAL NOTES

ON

FCC/FBIS INTERCEPTS

7 August 1945

Rail Transportation

The statement that "The main Tokaido line is in operation, except for certain sections", only those on official business are permitted to travel, and that no baggage is to be carried, are among the most conspicuous in this respect.

Atomic Bomb

The statement that the U. S. is desperately anxious to end the war and that the bomb is merely a manifestation of this anxiety is a typical Japanese reaction. Despite the unusually frank admission of its terrible effects the Japanese people probably do not have any conception of what will be the ultimate consequences of its use.

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Japanese
x FBIS
x Intercepts

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 16 July 1945

TO: Maj. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
The Director, OSS

FROM: E. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Langford Notes on FBIS Intercepts

Around 1 June this office started sending comments on FBIS intercepts originated by Mr. Randal Langford, who spent many years in the Japanese islands and whose history with Admiral Turner and General Hodges was relayed to Lt. Wilson.

We have been successful in having Langford provide his comments, particularly from the viewpoint of MO, and in a broader sense exhibiting his delineation of what he believed was actually going on in the minds of the Japanese, that he could feel reasonably comfortable about, after having studied the FBIS file.

His notes on the intercepts of 10 July I believe are rather interesting particularly in respect to the American tendency to provide, gratuitously, essentials to conquered or distressed peoples.

Copy of these comments is enclosed.

Mr. Langford's notes are evidently of value to the MO program people in San Francisco, as they have several times written complimentary letters. In respect to the Washington use of these notes, I think that Lt. Wilson is forwarding them to Mrs. Jane Smith-Hutton for MO use there.

Enclosure

OSS
CONFIDENTIAL
LOUIS DEMBITZ
AG-140

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GENERAL NOTES

ON

RED/RED INTERESTS

CONFIDENTIAL

10 July 1945

Recent reports regarding the furnishing of Red Cross supplies to the natives of Okinawa may possibly fail to produce the expected results.

The people of Okinawa have always been oppressed, first by their own rulers and the Chinese and later by the Japanese. Any act of kindness or generosity is almost certain to be misunderstood, and there is a possibility that free distribution of supplies will bring forth complaints and loud cries for more.

My experience with these people in 1935-36 and 1938 resulted in several unpleasant incidents. If a native receives more pay than he expects he at once demands more. Ask a shopkeeper the price of an article, and offer him the price he gives and he will refuse to sell at all. If they are paid less than they expect it will be accepted with little or no protest.

These people are apparently very necessary and when they are given more than is expected it is likely that they feel it would be possible to get even more.

It is my opinion that they would be much better satisfied if they were required to work for whatever is given to them.

Gifts for the Japanese will also require care, or results will not be satisfactory but the Japanese will react in a different manner.

The giving of presents to Japanese or of assistance that is not requested is not done in our way. The suggestion being very close friends, relatives, or the Japanese Government. Presents by all others are given in payment for some favor or because the giver expects a favor. When a present is given to a Japanese, if he has done nothing to deserve it, it is taken for granted that a favor is expected. He at once attempts to discover what is desired. If the giver insists that it is given because of friendship, he then questions that the present be returned that the giver is ashamed to state what is desired. A Japanese will accept the present, but will be very suspicious of the giver and quite likely will return the favor by some unpleasant trick.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Notes on ERIS/FOS Intercepts

10 July 1963

The Red Cross relief work in Japan after the 1923 earthquake is a very good example of what is to be expected. When relief supplies began to arrive the Foreign Office at once asked our Ambassador what payment was expected. He naturally replied that it was a token of sympathy and assistance to recover from the disaster. This was not believed and a strenuous effort was made to find out first what the United States expected in return for the assistance given. Naturally they were unable to get the information.

The conclusion arrived at, by even the educated Japanese, was that the United States was taking advantage of the disaster to get control of their government. "We are a poor nation lacking in resources and have nothing to give to a rich nation like the United States. The only possible demand they can make upon us is to get control of our government." This opinion was expressed to me on several occasions by well educated men, some of them educated in the United States. They asked me confidentially if it could possibly be true.

I am convinced that the total result of the great amount that was given to the Japanese for earthquake relief created, instead of gratitude and friendship, only fear and suspicion.

To my mind, two serious mistakes were made: first, we should have requested a reasonable payment for the relief for the reasons given above; second, the distribution of the supplies should have been planned entirely by Japanese hands, and they should have been allowed by handle it in their own way without comment or criticism. Our unasked methods of distribution frightened the Japanese and did much to convince them that we had ulterior motives.

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Continued

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CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA MAR 61

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments

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

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16666

Japanese
Saburo
Fee
FBIS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

HONOLULU T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 22 March 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: Japanese Propaganda on USSR via FBIS Intercepts

Enclosed are additional intercepts on the above subject dated March 15 and March 9, which supplement the material forwarded to you with our letter of March 19 on the same subject.

Respectfully,

To Communications

Enclosures

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TO OWI
OWI CH BC HT

TO THIS ONE WORKER "WALLISTER STORM
WORKER HERE SHANGHAI IN ENGLISH AT 1215Z ON WEDNESDAY 3114/43 TO EAST
ASIA

WE BRING YOU AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CHRISTIAN RED RUSSIA" TAKEN FROM
THE CHOSEN DAILY.

(TEXT) WHEN FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT ASSERTED IN THE AUTUMN OF NINETEEN
FORTY-ONE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS A CHRISTIAN NATION WHICH RESPECTED
FREEDOM OF WORSHIP, HE WAS NOT ONLY LYING TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BUT
HE WAS ALSO INSULTING THE CHURCH. NO NATION IN HISTORY, NOT EVEN ANCIENT
ROME, HAS EVER PERSECUTED RELIGION WITH SUCH FANATICAL AND RUTHLESS FURY.
NO CREED HAS EVER CLAIMED TO BE MORE VICIOUS AMONG CHRISTIANS AS THE
BOLSHEVISM.

THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN CRUSH CONDUCTED BY THE KREMLIN ARE AS IN-
FAMOUS AS THEY ARE (WORD). THEY ARE KNOWN TO FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND
TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. HENCE, EVEN MORE INCONCEIVABLE
THAT THE PRESIDENT NEED TO HOPE THAT HE COULD DECEIVE THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE INTO BELIEVING THAT THE SOVIET WERE IN FACT A CHRISTIAN NATION
IN THE TIME OF A COALITION OF GODLESSNESS WITH.

FOR ANOTHER, AFTER ROOSEVELT'S PRONOUNCEMENT, STALIN DID INDEED GO
THROUGH THE SEMBLANCE OF A CHURCH, BUT THAT WAS ONLY BECAUSE HE NEED
THE SUPPORT OF WORLD OPINION. NOW THAT THIS GREAT CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET
UNION HAS PASSED, HOWEVER, THE KREMLIN IS AGAIN BRANDED WITH ITS
GUILT.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[illegible] 9 YAMA OR TWENTY-FOUR
[illegible] WIJ 800[illegible]
TO WWT
Q7A [illegible] MC BT

TO THIS ONE HUNDRED MCALLISTER SFRAN

M60350 TOKYO (DOMEI) IN ENGLISH AT 4100 AM FRIDAY 3/9/45 TO PACIFIC

(TEXT) TOKYO MARCH NINE--THE "NIPPON TIMES" EDITORIALLY, UNDER THE CAPTION "DIVINE RIGHT THEORY," SAID THE "AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE "BIG THREE" AT THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE LAST MONTH ON VOTING PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF PROPOSED POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MACHINERY IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE BIGGEST DIPLOMATIC SETBACKS WHICH THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE SO FAR SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION."

"IT IS ANOTHER EVIDENCE OF THE IRRECONCILIABILITY OF THEIR NATIONAL AMBITIONS," THE JOURNAL CONTINUES. THE JOURNAL RECALLED THAT AT THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE THE SOVIET UNION DEMANDED THAT THERE MUST BE A UNANIMOUS VOTE ON ALL ISSUES IN WHICH A PERMANENT MEMBER HAS A PARTY TO A DISPUTE.

"THIS DISAGREEMENT OVER VOTING METHOD WAS A FUNDAMENTAL ONE WHICH DID NOT PERMIT OF ANY TWO-WAY COMPROMISE," THE JOURNAL SAID. IT ADDED THAT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER HAD TO GIVE IN. AND THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE.

"ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNTRIES BOWED BEFORE THE REALISTIC DIPLOMACY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, ACCORDING TO AN 'AGREEMENT' REACHED AT YALTA, A NATION PARTY TO A DISPUTE IS OBLIGED TO ABSTAIN FROM VOTING ON QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO SUCH SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS INVESTIGATION OF DISPUTES LIKELY TO THREATEN PEACE AND OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS," THE JOURNAL MAINTAINS.

THE EDITORIAL EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS NOT ITS POLITICAL OBJECTION ALONE TO THE INCORPORATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF A VETO OR UNANIMITY OF POWERS, BUT IT POINTED OUT SEVERAL SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE [illegible] WHICH IT WOULD BE OBLIGED.

THIS CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE VETO POWER BY ANY MINOR POWER OR ANY GROUPING OF ANY SMALL IMPORTANCE. IT ADDED, "THE FACT THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET UNION POWERS WERE UNABLE TO ARRIVE AT ANY BETTER SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM OF VOTING METHOD IS A MERCILESS CRITICISM OF THE FACT THAT FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL PEACE ORGANIZATION CANNOT BE CONCEIVED EXCEPT IN THE PRESUPPOSITION OF A SPIRIT OF [illegible] GOOD FAITH."

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THIS CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE VETO POWER BY ANY RUSSIA FOR ANY CHANGE OF ANY REAL IMPORTANCE. IT ADDED, "THE FACT THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET TRIUM POWERS WERE UNABLE TO ARRIVE AT ANY BETTER SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM OF VOTING METHOD IS A DEFINITE CONFIRMATION OF THE FACT THAT THIS PROJECTED INTERNATIONAL PEACE ORGANIZATION CANNOT CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A REAL, EQUITABLE WORLD PEACE."

"THIS CRIMEA ARRANGEMENT AMOUNTS TO NO MORE THAN A SUBSTITUTION OF ONE EVIL FOR ANOTHER EVIL," THE JOURNAL SAID, ADDING, "FOR WHILE THE SOVIET UNION SUCCEEDED IN FRUSTRATING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DESIGN TO MANIPULATE THE PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO FAVOR THEIR OWN SELFISH NATIONAL INTERESTS, NOW ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS STAND ABOVE THE LAW AND CANNOT BE BROUGHT TO BOOK FOR ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND THREATS TO PEACE."

THE EDITORIAL SAID, "THE EFFECT OF THIS SOLUTION OF VOTING PROCEDURE IS THUS TO REVERSE (THE) THE RULING RIGHT THROUGH WHICH A COURT CAN DO ITS WORK AND ITS COROLLARY THAT SUBJECTS MAY NOT ACT ON THE NATIONS OF THEIR RULER. THE PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS REMAINS AS BEFORE AN ORGANIZATION SUBJECTED TO BIG POWERS."

"THIS COULD BE MORE SYMBOLIC OF THE SINISTER POWER POLITICS," "NATIONALIST UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE DISCRIMINATION OF SMALLER POWERS HAS BEEN INTENSE," THE EDITORIAL SAID, ADDING, THAT IT IS VERY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE WEAKEN OF SMALL NATIONS WILL BE INCREASED BY THE "BIG THREE POWERS." IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THE "THREE GIANTS" CONCERNED, "THEIR OWN TRUST" WILL ONE STRONGHOLD PERIOD TO HAVE THEIR PLANS ADOPTED BY SMALL NATIONS AT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE."

IN CONCLUDING, THE EDITORIAL SAID, "DOMINATION OF THIS PLANT INSTRUMENT BY THE "BIG THREE," AS WELL AS THE DISCRIMINATION WHICH SMALLER NATIONS SUFFER BY REASON OF POINT UNDER SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, ARE OF SUCH FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE THAT THEY WILL USE THE SAME ARGUMENTS WITHOUT AVAIL POSSIBLY TO DEMAND AN UNJUST PEACE ON THE WORLD." END

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MAR 24 1 07 PM '45

John Magruder

Please Love

Lt Elsa

24 hours. Memo for Gen Magruder suggesting 24 hr watch.

27 hours - approved by WD - & my hours rel. to Chapman

Expense is $45 of $65

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 16 March 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: JCC-FBIS Intercept Material

You will recall that I reported to you at the time of Mr. Hyneman's visit here that he seemed somewhat upstirred by the fact that although OSS in Washington insisted on getting all the intercept material, he had discovered that the teletype which was carrying this material into OSS was turned off by us at the close of office hours and the weight of the material which is hitting the Mainland at night was presumably not being received by OSS.

Mr. Shepherd, FBIS Chief, tells me he has a letter from Mr. Hyneman of March stating in effect that OSS still is cutting off JCC teletype carrying Japanese intercepts during nights, Sundays and holidays.

It may be that Mr. Hyneman is incorrectly informed but, on the other hand, it might be something that you wish to look into.

The FBIS intercept station on Saipan is now transmitting material to us here over the ship circuit and it is being relayed from that station over the Pentagon and Washington [illegible] new material is slated to be on a different and larger [illegible] presently experiencing the changes necessitated from the [illegible] Bomb.

[illegible] at the OSS/FBIS plant will be that the JCC-FBIS [illegible] Combined Operation [illegible] with us, as it may [illegible] proposed to do a [illegible] job, the [illegible] up by that date we will have [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible]

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General Donovan -2- 16 March 1945

Subject: MIS-X Intercept Material

The writer inspected the MIS-X installation at Kunai this week and has nothing but commendation for the work they are doing.

It appears to me that all of this MIS-X stuff is of immense value to SI, SO, MO, and X-2. It is my belief that the full service will be very helpful to us.

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Mar 26 11 59 AM '45

To

From Magruder

No comment

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SECRET

Japanese Pulayeff

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU 1. T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 16 March 1945

FOR GENERAL DONOVAN ONLY

TO: General William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: H. Davis Hallowell, Comdr., USNR

SUBJECT: MIS - MIS

Mr. Shepherd tells me confidentially that somehow the British apparently found out that he was having trouble getting enough Asiatic language monitors to run his two intercept stations full-blast.

The result was that MIS, which, I understand, is a part of MIS and in essence is the opposite of MIS in this country, has generously offered to give the twelve experts, asserted for their knowledge of Japanese, Chinese, and other oriental languages, face-for-nothing if Shepherd will distribute them between Kodiak and Hawaii.

Shepherd believes that this might be one solution to the problem but I pointed out to him the desirability of having this infiltration reviewed on a higher echelon, pointing out incidentally by stating that possibly the biggest criticism we would be upset if MIS would up with a lot of Englishmen.

Shepherd sought the point and is communicating with Mr. Lyman via a letter one of the technicians is taking to Washington today. It is also interesting the engineer to discover the matter orally and at length with Mr. Lyman and discuss the matter with Shepherd I would see that you were posted in the event Lyman may see fit to consult with you.

[illegible] the course of the conversation Shepherd [illegible] the fact that the British [illegible] in the [illegible] particularly in the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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Apr. 20, 1945.

Memorandum:

To: Mrs. O'Donnell.
From: Robert E. Barnes.

The attached correspondence from Comdr. Halliwell has been disposed of, General Donovan having directed General Magruder suffiicient number of people to monitor our FCC teletype service in Central Building on a 24-hour a day basis. I think the correspondence should be returned to General Doering's file, since he has complete files on Honolulu.

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Frame No. 1111

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

HONOLULU, T. H.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 19 March 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan
The Director - OSS

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]

References: Honolulu Memo to Mr. Chester F Hardy, Washington Radio, 3/2

We enclose herewith three very incomplete collections of this material, which have been extracted from the MIS files.

It is virtually impossible for us to rebuild the complete file on all of these FCC intercepts referred to in the writer's memorandum of 2 March, due to the manner in which the FBIS material was coming in, on our teletype and being received by mail (during the period in question) from the other FBIS intercept stations on the Pacific Coast. January and February particularly were the transition period.

An additional handicap is the impracticability of the MIS here maintaining a complete breakdown of subject matter in their files, as much of the Tokyo [redacted] broadcasts are sent in code or are filed under headings designed to satisfy the requirements of MIS publications being issued in the PCA.

Limiting the difficulty we would have reconstructing the complete file, we asked other intelligence agencies in this [redacted] who had delivered to them the complete service to re- [redacted] Russian material from their files, but unanimously the [redacted] that owing to the circumstances.

In order to show a thorough and exhaustive picture, it is [redacted] the complete OSS file at MIS for the past three months [redacted] be optional in every case that the abbreviated volume [redacted] made available from the collections forwarded herewith.

[redacted]

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You will observe that we have included very little, relatively, of the Tokyo "FBIS SUMMARY" in this collection.

The contrast in the consistent "line" of propaganda is most conspicuous when the Russian subject matter beamed by the Tokyo radio to their homeland is contrasted with other Russian subject matter beamed by Tokyo to other areas; also, it is considered important to note the contrast of the Tokyo material with the "line" which is taken by the other stations on the attached list.

In connection with the complete FBIS intercepts, reference is the writer's letters to General Donovan 16 March and Colonel Doering 20 October 1944 may indicate that a portion of this service is missing from the OSS files in Washington. Consequently, the suggestion is made that the complete file be reviewed in the FBIS headquarters.

Respectfully,

Enclosures

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HONOLULU, T. H.

19 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM RE: RADIO INTERCEPTS BY FRUS IN POA --

The attached list shows the origin of enemy programs being intercepted in whole or in part by FRUS in POA:

Interception as of this date is:

(a) Majority of these programs being intercepted at Kauai;

(b) Minority of appropriate wave length being intercepted at Guam; a n d

(c) Some portions being intercepted on Pacific Coast.

The transitional period of FRUS intercepting shift from Pacific Coast and Oahu to Kauai and Guam has been the period of January 1, 1945, to date.

In order to be more complete coverage during this period in mid, intercepts covering the stations on the attached list from all four sources must be examined.

[redacted], USNR,
[redacted],
[redacted] Officer,

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TIME (EST)	LOCATION OF STATION	LANGUAGE	BEAMED TO
2345-2400	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0040	Domei	English	Pacific
0000-0030	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0300	[illegible] Shanghai	English	E. Asia
0000-0240	Domei	English	E. America
0000-0315	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0425	[illegible] Shanghai	English	E. Asia
0000-0440	Heishing	English	W. EA
0000-1200	[illegible] Shanghai	German	E. Asia
0000-0440	Domei	English	Pacific
0000-1225	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0430	[illegible] Shanghai	Cantonese	E. Asia
0000-0430	Heishing	Manderin	E. Asia
0000-0500	Tokyo JEMS		
0000-0500	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0500	[illegible] Shanghai	Manderin	E. Asia
0000-0500	Heishing	English	W. EA
0000-0500	Domei	English	Pacific
0000-0500	Tokyo	English	W. USA
0000-0500	Domei	English	Pacific
0000-0500	Tokyo JEMS		
0000-0500	Tokyo	German	Europe
0000-0500	Tokyo	English	Australia
0000-0500	Domei	English	E. America
0000-0500	Tokyo JEMS		
0000-0500	Tokyo	Italian	Europe
0000-0500	[illegible]	Cantonese	Far East
0000-0500	[illegible]	French	Far East
0000-0500	[illegible]	English	Europe
0000-0500	Domei	English	Pacific
0000-0500	Tokyo JEMS		
0000-0500	Tokyo JEMS		
0000-0500	[illegible]	French	Far East
0000-0500	[illegible]	English	Australia
0000-0500	Tokyo	German	Europe
0000-0500	Tokyo	Spanish	Europe
0000-0500	[illegible]	English	Europe
0000-0500	Tokyo	French	Europe
0000-0500	[illegible]	English	E. America
0000-0500	[illegible]	Manderin	Home Service
0000-0500	Tokyo	Manderin	China
0000-0500	[illegible] Nanking	Manderin	Home Service
0000-0500	[illegible] Shanghai	Cantonese	China
0000-0500	[illegible]	English	Australia & N.Z.
0000-0500	[illegible]	Spanish	Latin America
0000-0500	[illegible] Manderin	English	Forces in New Guinea
0000-0500	Tokyo	Portuguese	English
0000-0500	Tokyo	[illegible]	China
0000-0500	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] & Far East

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[illegible] (GMT)	LOCATION OF STATION	LANGUAGE	BEAMED TO
0800-0900	[illegible]		
	[illegible]	English	E. Asia
0800-0810	Tokyo JSDF		
0800-0810	Tokyo JSDF		
0800-0815	Saigon		
0800-0810	Nanking	French	IndoChina & Far East
0850-0855	Tokyo	English	China
0900-0910	Tokyo	Cantonese	China
0900-1000	Nanking	Tagalog	Philippines
0900-0915	Peking	Mandarin	E. Asia
0900-0915	Peking	Mandarin	Near Service
0900-0915	Tokyo	English	S W America
0900-0930	[illegible]	English	China
0900-1500	[illegible]	English	E. Asia
0930-0940	Tokyo	Spanish	Philippines
0955-0955	Tokyo	French	IndoChina & Far East
0955-1000	[illegible] Chungking	Mandarin	China & S American
1000-1015	[illegible] Chungking	English	China & S American
1000-1015	Tokyo	English	Philippines
1000-1015	[illegible]	English	S W America
1000-1015	[illegible]	English	India
1000-1100	[illegible]	English/	
		Cantonese	Near Asia
1015-1050	[illegible] Chungking	English	China & S American
1030-1100	[illegible] Yenan Prvce	English	S American
1040-1100	[illegible]	English	S American
1100-1130	Yenan Prvce	English	S American
1100-1130	[illegible]	French	Far East

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

HONOLULU, T. H.

19 March 1945.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(a) [redacted]

(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Form 88 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 25 APRIL 45

FROM VICTOR, SAN FRANCISCO

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

5

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 11361

FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION
HALLIWELL	DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, F.SECT.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#0114. HALLIWELL FROM CONNELY. SECRET

YOUR HONOLULU OFFICE REPORTS THAT RESEDA INTERCEPTS ARE CONTINUING TO BE FORWARDED. THEY ARE UNDER IMPRESSION THAT YOU NO LONGER WANT THEM. IF SO WE WILL STOP SENDING THEM.

FILE COPY

TOR: 1935 25 APRIL 45 SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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

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16,366
Japanese
x Intercepts
x Lucy

5 April 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: Commander H. S. Morgan

From: General Donovan

Subject: Dissemination of Material from Radio Monitoring

Thank you for your message. I am sending word to Lucy, telling him that I have seen now what I wished and that it will all be taken care of in the normal dissemination.

W. J. D.

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16,366
Japanese
x Intercepts
x Library

5 April 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. A. R. Lumsy

From: General Donovan

Subject: Dissemination of Radio Intercepts

Thank you very much for the papers you have been sending to me. It has given me in practice form the kind of information that is being rendered.

It will be no longer necessary to continue sending the material to me as I will have access to the normal dissemination.

Thank you and I hope to see you soon out your way.

W. J. D.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major General William J. Donovan DATE: 5 April 1945

FROM : Commander H. S. Morgan

SUBJECT: Dissemination of material from radio monitoring.

1. You will no doubt remember that Lieutenant Nicholson and I discussed with you the other day the method of dissemination of the traffic monitored at the two FBQ stations at Reseda and Bellmore, at which time we arranged to supply to you directly certain "logs" prepared by A. R. Lusey in Los Angeles and further arranged that a copy of all disseminations of such material made by the Reporting Board should be sent to you. At that time we pointed out that the material which you receive from Lusey via my office is duplicated in the disseminations of the Reporting Board and that no special disseminations should be made from your office, either inside or outside OSS, without getting my office to check for possible duplications.

2. Certain confusion has arisen in the minds of some of the personnel in the SI Far Eastern Division due to having received such material direct from you as well as from the Reporting Board. May I ask that any disseminations which you wish to make be checked with my office, to enable us to advise you whether this represents any duplication.

H. S. Morgan

cc: Lt. Col. Sands

Harry
I have sent message 75 with Lusey saying that I have sent what I wanted to Donovan & me.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 29 MAR 45 REC'D 1344 29 MAR 45

TO VICTOR, HONOLULU

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION OUT 7542

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR SECRETARIAT, FIELD SECTION

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER CONFIDENTIAL

#3927. HALLIWELL FROM PUTZELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

THANKS FOR INTERCEPTS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXAMINED WITH INTEREST HERE. HAVE REVIEWED SUBJECT THIS END AND FIND WE OBTAIN ALL SUCH FBIS MATERIAL THROUGH LOCAL SOURCES. THEREFORE DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY TO BURDEN POUCH WITH MATERIAL FROM YOUR END. GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR CAUSING US TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON MATTER.

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT REC'D 29 MAR 45

FILE COPY

IT IS REQUESTED THAT REFERENCE TO THIS CABLE BE KEPT AT A MINIMUM AND THAT ITS CONTENTS BE DISCLOSED ONLY TO PERSONS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OR POSSESSION THEREOF.

EJP

INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

WITHDRAW ALL INFORMATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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Form 4-131

Date 3/26

To: Mr. Bissell

RJP

Looked RHO 3/2

Outs
card (green)
the comp field

Action of the Executive Officer

of

Exec. No. 11/5

Expenses 11 1/25 3/6.63

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SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

The Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ER SECRET

[redacted]

15 March 1966

[redacted]

Barnes

[redacted]

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SECRET
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[redacted] 15 March 1948

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ and SECRET

Colonel E. P. Connely

18 March 1948

Mr. Harold E. Exton

Additional Information re Classification of Intercept Specifications - (My memorandum 16 March 1948).

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

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16,366

Japanese
x intercepts
x Jersey, AR

SECRET

General Donovan

22 March 1943

Commander R. H. Hillenkoetter, USN
[redacted]
Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Commander:-

[redacted]

SECRET

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SECRET

Commander Hillenkoetter

10 March 1948

[redacted]

SECRET

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16,366

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Intelligence

Ordinarily the Committee on Dissemination would not give high-level dissemination (as distinct from routine dissemination) to the three items listed below:

Radio Intercept: This identical message appeared in the March 16, 1945, issue of the Daily Report, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission.

IM Cable #8163 (Kandy): Many reports have established that Japanese military activity in the Burma-Thai-FIC region has been intensified in recent weeks. This cable, particularly since it mentions such a small number of artillery pieces and freight tonnage, appears to be local battle order rather than strategic intelligence.

IM Cable #8232 (Caserta): The Soviet order disbanding regimental and division headquarters is reported by a partial source who makes it appear an important policy decision. Analysts comment that such headquarters are primarily a mobilization point, not an important part of the Rumanian Army.

Corcoran Thom, Jr., Maj. AC
Chairman,
Committee on Dissemination

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

26 Apr. '45

To: General Donovan

Nov 25 12 33 PM '45

Please ask General Donovan's

request. Can this be done today?

R I

Robert Tarr

Office of the Executive Officer

SECRET

Out

car

the camera

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ..

Date Rec'd SA .....

	Officer's Initials	Comments

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

Intercepts
Lusey -

MEMORANDUM

24 March 1945

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Japan-China Sec., FEI

SUBJECT: Mr. Lusey's memorandum of 19 March 1945

1. The Intelligence Officers of this Section have reviewed this memorandum and attachments. They consider the message from Tass, Tokyo to Tass, Moscow as extremely interesting and novel and worth a special dissemination over your signature to General Arnold. Dr. Buchanan's comment on this item follows.

> "This intercept is very interesting and important. It gives us a side line on actual conditions in Tokyo after the bombing raid of the night of March 10. The Domei reports are quite the opposite in content and tend to minimize the effect of the bombing. It is my opinion that we should send this to A-2 and perhaps also to the Navy."

2. The apparent recent tendency on the part of the Japanese to give the Russians comparative freedom of communication out of Japan may make future Tass intercepts of this sort of considerable intelligence value.

3. The other items sent by Mr. Lusey are not considered of sufficient interest to merit special dissemination.

4. In addition to special dissemination of the Tass report, we should like to give it regular Reporting Board dissemination and request that a copy be returned for this purpose.

Robert B. Lee, Maj. AUS
Chief, Japan-China Sec.,
Far East Division, FI

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OSS Form 22-82a

FROM:

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. [illegible]		[illegible]			
2. [illegible]			3/23	[illegible]	
3. [illegible]			3/27	[illegible]	Memo attached.
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing slips should always be returned to Registry.
Each Officer desiring copy of document should request.

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To: MAJOR LEE

It might be advisable to send the attached message to the Air Force, but I want your view of it before doing so.

Also will you look at the Morse Code Broadcast and see if in your opinion it would be helpful to General Hurley.

W.J.D.

21 March 1945

Director's Office

green edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Gen. W.J. Donovan DATE: 19 March 1945

FROM : A.H. Leg

SUBJECT: Radio Intercept.

C O N T E N T S

(1) Commercial message from Canton to Cholon discussing possible routes for travel from Canton to Saigon.

(2) & (3) Two messages from Shanghai to Canton, containing references to "overland route."

(4) A commercial press message from Tass in Tokyo to Tass in Moscow. This is a very interesting report on casualties and civilian panic during our air-raids on Tokyo. The censors have allowed Tass an astonishing amount of latitude in transmitting such material to Moscow.

This report includes several different messages over the weekend; the references are all to the same raid.

(5) A Japanese Government message from Shigemitsu in Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. It is interesting to note that the Japanese Foreign Office considers the "declaration of independence" of the Province of Annam sufficiently important to use it as propaganda in Berlin.

(6) A Japan Morse code press broadcast reports the setting up of "Kiangsu-Chekiang Military District" on the border between these two provinces. This "District" includes the important cities of Shanghai, Nanking and Hangchow.

A report from the "Shantung Liberated Area" says that 10 million dollars (local Shantung currency) have been set aside for production loans. The report says that the Shantung Liberated Area dollar equals 20 Chungking National Currency." Another report from Yenan says that transportation in Shansi Province from Sian to Yuchiehtu, a distance of 30 miles, has risen from 10 to 20 dollars Chinese National Currency, per catty. [illegible] Army [illegible] rations. The report says that the remaining authorities are trying [illegible] to facilitate military [illegible]. The report [illegible] and that these troops are west of the Yellow River and north of the [illegible] railway. "Far from this the Japanese Army is increasing" and that the Shansi troops only the number of attacking and disturbing [illegible] Shansi regions).

cc: Col. E.F. Cunningham

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LANGUAGE: ENGLISH FILED: 3/17/45

FROM: KWANCHUEN
CANTON

TO: HOYUENKI
114H RUE DESMARINS
CHOLON

CONSULT HUNGKU ANY GOOD PROSPECTS MY IMMEDIATE RETURN INDOCHINA COMPULSORY CAN TRY ROUTE VIA KWONGCHOWWAN OR THROUGH KWANGSI PROVINCE REGARDING SELLING TAISAIKAI PENDING YOUR RETURN TELEGRAM DETERMINATION STOP BEEN MISSING YOU LOVE.

(1)

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LANGUAGE: JAPANESE FILED: 3/13/45

FROM: SHANGHAI
GENERAL AFFAIRS MANAGER

TO: CANTON
GENERAL AFFAIRS MANAGER
MITSUIBUSSAN.

ORDINARY WIRE OF THE 3RD. THE FAMILIES OF THE BRANCH OFFICE, 23 PERSONS, LEFT ON THE 10TH BY OVERLAND ROUTE.

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LANGUAGE: JAPANESE FILED: 3/13/45

FROM: SHANGHAI TO: CANTON,
TOSHIHIDE AKIYAMA
MITSUI BUSSAN

NO BOAT TRANSPORTATION. NO TRANSPORTATION OUTSIDE OF OVERLAND ROUTE. IF TERMS ARE ACCEPTED AT YOUR PLACE CAN TALK BUSINESS, CAN YOU MAKE THE DEAL?

(3)

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14121 As result of night air raid, March 10, thousands of refugees are crowding around railway stations trying to leave capital. Everywhere on streets are seen various kinds of vehicles from lories to rikshas loaded with belongings of peoples evacuating city. Hospitals overcrowded with sufferers injured during air raid and stopped usual ordinary work.

* * * wind was such that it spread flames which were higher in speed than that of a person running and so all flames were seen conglomerating at different places. Hence, large numbers of people lost their way of escape and were burned to death. The largest number of people found burned to death were in places where they brought out their belongings from their homes. At some places bicycles packed with belongings were found congested and many people were found piled up on them killed. This is because they tried to carry out their belongings while trying to escape, and with still others coming from behind they were caught amid huge crowds and burned to death.

Below is article Asahi describing partly situation in city. Asahi put questions to representatives of Tokyo Metroplitan Office and latters answer on them:

Question - After air raid many persons found injured in eyes by fire, but necessary medical care could not be given them.

Answer - There were not enough eye doctors, at same time physicians in general should be more kind and careful about rendering whatever service they can in such case.

Question - Large number of refugees were thronging from all sides and rushing to bridges for escaping, but finally were caught by fire and burned to death. Is it not necessary to have proper commanders show people right way for escape?

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Answer - Policemen are obliged to give such command but it is difficult for them to find out such, way in advance. In future, proper steps should be taken.

Question - Even after three days, sufferers are wandering about at places refuged to ashes hoping to find whether their family members missing are safe or not.

Answer - It is impossible to force these sufferers to withdraw from such places immediately, but we are planning to disperse them to country-sides as much as possible.

Question - What means are taken for transportation of air raid sufferers?

Answer - Special trains were run on the 11th and 12th for transportation of air raid sufferers without tickets. However, there is limit of transportation, so sufferers must wait two or four days more. Transportation for air raid sufferers and foodstuffs will be secured absolutely but for time being, no preference can be given for transportation of those who are dispersing from capital.

Asahi Shimbun published interview with Vice President Kumagai of General Air Defense Headquarters who is in charge of execution of government decision concerning dispersion in principal cities. Answering to questions, Kumagai stated: Present dispersion plan determined for relieving Tokyo and other cities of burdensomeness in order to accelerate realisation of self-living, self-fighting structure. Policy is to evacuate all people except those who are essential in present time of emergency, and their helpers only. From population viewpoint, henceforth Tokyo will return to status of old time capital, so that present measure to be enforced would prove to be fairly large-scale one. Strong persuation will be made for people. In case people do not respond to this official persuation then unavoidably strong power would be invoked. In case people who are required to remain in Tokyo prefer to go away, authorities would forcedly keep

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such people in Tokyo. Dispersion into interior of children and [illegible]
mothers would be strongly encouraged. As far as possible, evacuees would
be encouraged to go to their own relatives in interior, but if someone has
no relatives or friends, proportional population dispersion for all pre-
fectures would be effected. Evacuees would never be allowed to be without
work, as they would be called upon to do farm work. Personnel dispersion
train service will be done with exclusive evacuee trains put into operation
by continuing for time being on present high degree railway service restric-
tions of ordinary passengers. Evacuee's household articles would be brought
up by government or would be officially held in custody. Intending
evacuees are being encouraged to go away with as few things as possible.
This emergency measure may appear to be too much, but authorities desire
that evacuees would place themselves in position of having to become
actually sufferers from air raid.

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LANGUAGE: ENGLISH FILED: 3/17/45

FROM: SHIGEMITSU TOKYO TO: JAPANESE EMBASSY BERLIN

ANNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE GRIMLY RESOLVED TO SEND ALL THEIR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE COMMON PROSPERITY OF ALL PEOPLES IN THIS QUARTER OF GLOBE ON HISTORIC DAY OF INDEPENDENCE IT AFFORDS GREATEST PLEASURE KINGDOM OF ANNAM TO EXPRESS ITS PROFOUNDEST RESPECT AND ESTEEM TO JAPAN. ANNAMESE PEOPLE DEEM IT HIGHEST HONOR TO LOOK UPON JAPAN AS LEADER GREATER EAST ASIA TOGETHER WITH OTHER GREATER EAST ASIATIC NATIONS. ANNAM EXPRESSES THANKS FROM THE BOTTOME OF HER HEART TO JAPAN FOR UNSTINTED AID EXTENDED IN ATTAINING INDEPENDENCE. HUE CORRESPONDENT ASAHI SHIMBUN SAYS EMPEROR BAODAI CONCLUDED HIS INTERVIEW WITH REQUEST THAT HIS INTERVIEW BE CONVEYED TO JAPAN AS HIS MESSAGE OF THANKS TO JAPANESE NATION. ANNAMESE ASPIRATION FULFILLED: "LONG CHERISHED ASPIRATION ANNAMESE BEEN FULFILLED WITH INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION ANNAM." DECLARED EMPEROR BAODAI OF ANNAM IN INTERVIEW GRANTED TO HUE CORRESPONDENT OF ASAHI SHIMBUN 16/3. INTERVIEW SPLASHED BY ASAHI SHIMBUN OVER FRONT PAGE SATURDAY'S ISSUE. THIRTY ONE YEAR SPORTSMAN EMPEROR GIVING FRANKFULLY TO CORRESPONDENTS INQUIRY SAID " DREAM 18 MILLION ANNAMESE PEOPLE HAS COME TRUE. ENTIRE NATIONAL OVERWHELMED WITH REJOICINGS. FROM NOW ON ANNAMESE PEOPLE, TRAINING YOUNGMEN ENHANCEMENT LIVING STANDARD AND DEVELOPMENT NATURAL RESOURCE. ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY ANNAM IN CONSTRUCTION OF GREATER EAST ASIA SPHERE PROSPERITY IS GREAT BUT IT BE REMEMBERED THAT ANNAM IS PREDESTINED TO BE PART AND PARCEL OF GREATER EAST ASIA.

(5)

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(6)

YENAN MORSE CODE BROADCAST

Central China Liberated Area, March 12: Inauguration of Kiangsu Chekiang Military District took place on February 5 at certain place at border of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces. This newly established military district includes triangular area where Shanghai, Nanking, and Hangchow are located. After pointing out importance of role in armed resistance by New Fourth Army in 7 years of struggle against Japanese invaders in area south of Yangtze River, Commander-in-Chief of this newly established military district, Su Yu said at inauguration meeting, "This meeting is not only review of our strength but it is also pledge to people of Kiangsu and Chekiang that we shall strive with our best to fulfill great task of preparing for counteroffensive driving out Japs and winning victory in War of Resistance.

- - - - - -

Shantung Liberated Area, March 12: Twenty million "Shantung Liberated Area" dollars have been set aside by the joint office of Central Shantung Military District Government for pushing forward big production movement this year. Fifteen million of this will be set aside for loans to cotton planter (One Shantung Liberated Area dollar equals twenty-three Chungking National Currency).

Dependents of Anti-Japanese soldiers and work exchange teams have priority in securing these loans while poor peasants and poor middle peasants who are short of labour, agriculture implements and seeds are also entitled to loans. Besides hundred million tan - tan equals four hundred pounds - of grain have been taken from Government granary to relieve people in Linsha county about 70 miles east of Yenan which had been stripped bare by Kuomintang Shantung provincial Government.

- - - - - -

Yenan, March 13: Chiang Chin-fen, Commissioner of Eighth Sub-district of Shansi province and one of leading members of Kuomintang

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Blue Shirtists reported at 33rd Shensi Province administrative meeting held middle of December, last year that Eight sub-district bears heaviest burden in whole Shensi province in military transport, building of fortifications and conscription of labour service since it lies immediately south of "Special Area" (meaning Shensi, Kansu, Ningksia border region), according to Chungking paper, "New China Daily".

This statement by Chiang reveals fact that transportation from Sian to Yaohsien 50 miles north of Sian has risen from ten to twenty dollars Chinese National Currency per catty - one and one third pounds - of army food ration. "New China Daily" also discloses that Kuomintang authorities are repairing mine highways in order to facilitate military transports. As these highways are in area west of Yellow River and north of Lunghai Railway far from where Japanese army is operating, they serve only purpose of attacking and blockading border region.

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

LOS ANGELES **CONFIDENTIAL**

16366 - Japanese

TO Maj. Gen. W.J. Donovan

FROM A.R. Lyon

DATE: 5 March 1945

SUBJECT Attached Intercepts.

Attached hereto are six intercept telegrams and one Yenan Morse code press broadcast.

I also enclose one commercial press message from the Tass News Agency in Shanghai to the head office in Moscow. Attention is called to the fact that this is a commercial intercept---not a propaganda broadcast.

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Language: Chinese

Filed: 8-26-45

From: Canton
Lang Chi Hsin

To: Shanghai
General Post Office

"All employees are starving and the sit-down strike has been on since the 24th (January) and we have no way of paying salaries or subsidies. Have earnestly counseled them to return to work and await decision. If no large amount arrives to relieve the situation it is impossible for us to carry on. Please reply immediately."

Comments and paraphrase by A.R. Lusey: We have had previous reference to sit-down strikes in Canton.

- - - - - - - -

Language: Japanese

Filed: 8-27-45

From: Shanghai
East Asia Marine Trans.

To: Tokyo
East Asia Marine Trans.,
Director General Affairs

"It has been decided that the area around the Cathay Mansions together with the buildings will be used by "RIKU" (Tn: Unknown). Tenants in the Cathay Mansions have been instructed to leave by March 13th. Our company liquidate on the 14th. Please advise all departments concerned."

Comments and paraphrase by A.R. Lusey: The Cathay Mansions is one of the largest and most modern apartment house buildings in Shanghai. It occupies a court, or compound-like area surrounded by one and two story shops and offices. This area is very strategically located -- it is in the French concession; actually is almost the exact heart of the Shanghai foreign settlement. The word "RIKU" may refer to military or "RIKUGUN", army. If the japs are planning a building-to building fight in Shanghai, this area could be converted into a very strong point.

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Language: Japanese

Filed: 2-27-45

From: Tsingtao, Nunsaka

To: Osaka,
Kumajiro Tanumi

"From ## (Someone, probably military, known to both sender and receiver) because of the huge demand for cement in North China please recommend a chief engineer. The renumeration will be similar to a director or advisor of construction. Please advise the prospects. Our telegraphic code address is "KOUZSEKISI" Tsingtao."

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Language: Japanese

Filed: 2-23-45

From: Tokyo
"Port and Bay Dept."
East Asia Marine Trans. Co.

To: Hongkong,
East Asia Marine Trans. Co.

"According to your telegram of January 10th, you have sent us the details of "Parimanchin" salvage by airmail. Nothing has arrived yet. Has the new rate been authorized by the Governor General's office or is it the same as the other companies? Furthermore we have had no notice of the effective date. Is it agreeable to make the effective date from the date set by the freight manager for the fourth "SHENTCHIN" salvage balance? Telegraph reply."

- - - - - - - - - - -

Language: Japanese

Filed: 2-24-45

From: Hongkong
Okazaki,
East Asia Marine Trans.

To: Shanghai,
Vice President Nakagawa,
East Asia Marine Trans.

"Refer our telegram of 18th. The Governor General's office is preparing to place the Motor schooner operating corporation, Production and Promotion Association, Public Welfare Association, and the motor schooner operated by the Governor General's office under one-man control."

Remarks and paraphrase by A.M. Lacey: These two messages appear to be further evidence that the Governor General's office of the "Special Hongkong Area" is tightening it's control of civilian activities.

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From: Tokyo
Main Office, Mitsui Line

To: Shanghai
Mitsui Line

"The cabinet meeting decided that the system of special skilled personnel for the moving of the ships is to be abandoned. We are going to cooperate fully with this new order, please bear this in mind. However, under the circumstances we are planning other work for this personnel to prevent unrest. As you are the head of this personnel, please endeavor to avoid the loss of efficiency which would follow such uneasiness. We are writing fully."

Comments and paraphrase by A.R. Lusey: Our consultant believes that this means the elimination of the "boss" system formerly used on Japanese merchant ships. He believes that this "Special skilled personnel" refers to union technical supervisors formerly carried on those ships. His interpretation is that it means practical elimination of union participation in the operation of Japanese merchant ships and that Mitsui expect widespread uneasiness to follow this decision. Another possibility is that the term "Special skilled personnel" means special crews placed on board the ships to move them about various harbours, or from dock to dock, thereby relieving the regular crews.

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COMMERCIAL PRESS MESSAGE

FROM: SHANGHAI 3-2-45
TASS

TO: MOSCOW 3-2-45
TASS

"TA KUNG PAO" IN ARTICLE " SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE AND SOVIET UNION" WRITES: THERE IS STILL TRIVIAL POINT LEFT ON WHICH ANGLO-AMERICANS ARE LAYING THEIR FINAL HOPE. THAT IS SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 25 WHICH IS TO SERVE FOR STUDYING AND PLANNING PEACE ORGANIZATION OF WORLD AS WELL AS ISSUE CONNECTED WITH IT. IT IS SAID THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF EAST ASIA INCLUDING DISPOSAL OF JAPAN WILL BE DISCUSSED. ANGLO AMERICANS EXPECTING GRASP THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN ASSURANCE WHICH THEY FAILED TO GET FROM THREE NATIONS CONFERENCE AND IF POSSIBLE OPEN NEW PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF WAR ON JAPAN. IT WOULD BE NOTED THAT CONFLICT OF INTEREST AMONG USA, BRITAIN, AND SOVIET UNION IN EAST ASIA IS EQUALLY OR EVEN MORE COMPLICATED AND ACUTE THAN THAT IN EUROPE. THESE THREE COUNTRIES ARE FINDING THEMSELVES INVOLVED IN SERIOUS MUTUAL CONFLICT OVER QUESTION OF INDIA, CHINA, AND TERRITORIAL POSSESSION OVER VARIOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS. HOWEVER, THEIR FOREMOST CONCERN OVER SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE IS FACT THAT IT IS TO BE HELD ON APRIL 25 WHICH IS FINAL DATE ON WHICH EITHER JAPAN OR SOVIET UNION MAY NOTIFY OFF ANOTHER OF ABROGATION ON JAPAN-SOVIET NEUTRALITY PACT AFTER CRIMEA CONFERENCE, CONTINUES PAPER, ANGLO-AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS HAVE MADE ALL KINDS OF CONJECTURES WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE CHANGE OF SOVIET UNION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS JAPAN. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO KNOW ONLY FACT THAT WHILE PLANNING CONVOCATION OF SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, USA AND BRITAIN ARE PLOTTING SUCH POLITICAL MANEUVERS DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET UNION.

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YENAN MORSE CODE BROADCAST

Yenan, March 2 - Commenting on Chiang Kai Shek's speech on March 1, at meeting for promotion of Constitutional Government New China News Agency correspondent said: This speech reflects in detail standpoint and plan of [illegible] clique in Kuomintang. This clique persists in dictatorship and their fascist and defeatist political and military policies, [illegible] coalition government democratic and people, plots to swallow up eighth route army and new four army and to abolish Chinese liberated areas. [illegible] clique plots Japanese aggression and is responsible for bringing about serious military, political, and economic crises in Kuomintang-controlled areas.

Chiang in making this speech merely once again plays part of spokesman for this extremely reactionary clique. Looking through whole speech important points can be summed up, as follows: One, Persistence in one party rule and resolute rejection of democratic coalition government. Two, false interpretation of negotiations between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party and slander against latter. Three, Playing up futile trick of so-called "returning reins of government to people" and "convention of national Congress" in order to preserve fascist dictatorship.

With regard to first point, Chiang said, "Recent demand of Communist party is that central government should abolish party rule at once and hand over administrative power to coalition government of all parties and groups. Our standpoint of government is complete readiness to admit all other political parties (including Communist party) and able new partisan people into government cannot deviate from "programme for national reconstruction" and put end to period of political tutelage or hand over political responsibility and right of final decision to all parties and groups thereby creating [illegible] situation which is in disharmony both with theory and facts."

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This is clear-cut indication of Chiang's persistence in maintaing dictatorship and rejection of coalition government.

Well, this open rejection of Chiang is much better than indefinite statements of Wang Shih Chieh, representative of Kuomintang in said negotiations. This open rejection enables others to see that his standpoint is clearcut and definite.

Besides above mentioned "programme for national reconstruction" Chiang advanced another reason for rejection of coalition government. For instance, he said, "If administrative responsibility is handed over to all parties and groups central government will certainly be swayed by every wind which will certainly result in defeat in armed resistance and terrible chaos in country." "Our conditions in our country are different from others. Before convention of national congress to have no responsible organization which can represent people and can consult peoples opinion." "Foundation of national government is paid by innumberable lives bloodshed and sacrifies of revolutionary heroes and army and people in war of resistance * * * it has responsibilities which cannot be given up * * * and national affairs cannot be trifled with." Etc.

To clearminded people all these are just lowgrade pretexts of despots and are not worth refutation. But since Chiang has talked so high handedly as though he were speaking truth we cannot keep silent. We must first of all see what clause of law has stipulated inviolability of "programme of national reconstruction"? "Programme of national reconstruction" is only kind of schems of national reconstruction proposed by Dr. Sun Yat Sen in his early days. It is no more inviolable gospel. Dr. Sun in his later days personally revised this schems.

In thirteenth year of Chinese republic Dr. Sun proposed convention of national congress with representatives of all parties and groups and all peoples to settle national affairs. Just before his death, Dr. Sun insistently instructed in his will "I propose calling of national congress in near

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future as he must within shortest period promote its realization. This is no because." Today twenty years after his death his unfaithful children and grandchildren who have betrayed his will - Kuomintang reactionary group and its leader Chiang Kai Shek are still clinging to that programme of national reconstruction which has been revised by Dr. Sun to maintain their personal dictatorship as their protective charm. Does this not make one die of laughter?

According to Dr. Sun's will would not calling conference of all parties and groups formation of coalition government to secure overthrow of Japanese invaders and then holding of free elections without fear and restrictions throughout country under government to convene national congress be just what would meet exigencies today? May I ask how formation of coalition government will lead to defeat of war of resistance and chaos of country? Can we say then that during eighteen years under personal dictatorship of Chiang Kai Shek without coalition government China has not suffered defeat in war of resistance and there is not yeat chaos in country? Without digging up for past let us take facts since Honan fighting last year. Within few months the enemy was able to connect up their continental communication line while hundreds of thousands of troops fled at enemy's approach. One hundred million of our countrymen in Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Kwantung have fallen under Japanese rule. Is this then not defeat of war of resistance or shall we call it instead victory of war of resistance? With secret political police overrunning land corruption rampant commerce and industry running into bankruptcy and people seething with complaints in Kuomintang-controlled areas is this then not confusion of country or shall we call it instead everything in order for country? Chinese communist party Chinese democratic league, democratic groups within Kuomintang have proposed immediate abolition of one party dictatorship and establishment of democratic provisional coalition central government with

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full backing of whole nation. Does this mean not just reflect popular will of whole nation desirous of overcoming fearful phenomenon of such defeat of war of resistance and confusion of country resulting from personal dictatorship of Chiang Kai Shek? Chinese nation does not wish personal dictatorship of Chiang Kai Shek to continue its existence for even one second. But Chinese people are clement. If coalition government is formed, Chiang Kai Shek may still be allowed to occupy seat in government to allow him to correct his former mistake and at one for his crimes to see his future results. But personal dictatorship which has led China into such deep and fiery crisis during past eighteen years and particularly past eight year of war of resistance must immediately end. This is already determined will of Chinese people.

So-called argument that prior to convention of national congress there is no responsible organization that can represent people in China and with which government can consult is also absurd and ridiculous. Why is it that for eighteen years there has only been personal dictatorship without representative organ of people? Whose responsibility is this? Our dictator strips people of all rights of freedom. Today he is not even willing to call conference of all parties and groups. His is, however, will to call national congress of slaves in November this year which he has postponed for eight years. Is it not only because national congress will be subservient that he is not will to "consult" it otherwise why should he be unwilling to "consult" easily convened conference of parties and groups?

"My regime has been gained through shedding of blood," he says. This is not rational argument but simply gangster talk. View of country as personal property and national affairs as game is just viewpoint of dictatorship looking over various "grounds" of Chiang for rejecting coalition government we find they are simply set of sophistries. But true reason reflects that Chiang and most reactionary group within Kuomintang want to

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hold on to interest of single person or group without caring [illegible] of country and nation. Only this point is true. All rest is humbug.

But most deserving of notice is that within short period of few months since proposal of abolition of Kuomintang Dictatorship to establish democratic coalition government it has by now electrified whole country and countries abroad and become proposal of broad masses. Hence Chiang Kai Shek has no alternative except that of coming out to express his straight refusal. (Second part follows tomorrow.)

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9 March 1945

The Honorable Patrick J. Hurley,
c/o Division of China Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Hurley:

I attach a few items obtained by means of the intercept facilities of which I have told you. These intercepts have proved of use both for direct military purposes and because of the possibilities they offer of examining certain currents of foreign opinion.

The intercepts under Tab A are broadcasts, both radio and Morse code, from Tokyo. They contain propaganda, of course, but also information on enemy activities and the Japanese press-mash. The text of the telegram of congratulation to Admiral Shiin is of interest.

Some of this material is of particular value when studied by persons with broad practical and scholarly background in the field. For example, the item under Tab B not only contains information as to a particular army, but the indication of the amount of rice required to supply the army makes it possible to calculate the approximate number of troops. Tab C consists of an intercept which, although but a routine request for additional interpreters, also contains information on specific airfields for which they are to be used.

The intercepts under Tab D are illustrative of intercepts that have in the past led to the sinking of Japanese ships.

Our facilities enabled us to pick up many interesting broadcasts prior to the recapture of the Philippines. Much pertinent information can be obtained from the day to day messages of ships and small broadcasting stations.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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ITEMS IN TAB A

1. Yenan Broadcast 13 February 1945
2. Yenan Broadcast 14 February 1945
3. Yenan Morse Code Broadcast 24 February 1945
4. Yenan Broadcast 25 February 1945 (contains congratulations to Marshal Stalin)
5. Yenan Morse Code Broadcast 25 February 1945
6. Yenan Broadcast 26 February 1945
7. Yenan Broadcast 27 February 1945
8. Yenan Morse Code Broadcast 28 February 1945
9. Yenan Morse Code Broadcast 2 March 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16,362
Japan
x Little, Herbert
x Kaji
x Intelligence

13 March 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: General Donovan
~~Lt (jg) E. I. Putnell, USNR~~

From: Lt Edward G. Wilson, USNR

Subject: Japanese Report

On 12 March I gave Commander McInnis the report in Japanese, which was forwarded with Dick Heppner's letter of 27 February. He will have it translated.

Before the report is disseminated we will be consulted.

EDWARD G. WILSON
Lt., USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

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OSS Form 1961

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

To	Name	Initials
	O. G. Doering, Jr.	
	C. A. Hane	
	J. R. Donovan	
	D. C. Lee	
	G. S. Platt	
	P. F. Dwelshag	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
	A. J. Sullivan	
	R. Thom	
	Pilot	
7	Lt [illegible]	

(Over)

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Jim Bain (27 Jul Sat. AS.)

Neal Pulyer

Please let me know
when you have finished
this map so a complete
+ relevant map

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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Japan

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SUBJECT: Col. E. Little	ACCESSION NO.: DOTS 608
ADDRESSED TO: WJD	
DOCUMENT DATE: 27 Feb. 1945	ACCESSION DATE: 7 March 1945
DOCUMENT NO.: 15,362 COPY NO.:	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director
NO. OF PAGES: 32 ATTACHMENTS: 1	LOGGED BY: M.O'D.

ATTENTION

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the (name or office), Courier Receipt No.

	ADDRESSED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO	[signature]	3/7	13	[illegible]	5/7	2.30
2.		[signature]	7 Mar.	1630	[illegible]	7 Mar.	1630
3.		[signature]	3/7	1715	[illegible]	3/7	1715
4.		[signature]	8/7	1930	[illegible]		
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

In case of the officials named above, the TSCO will [illegible] this document, [illegible] shall [illegible] the document to a person [illegible] in his Office. He must then destroy the document by burning or [illegible] instead of the person [illegible] this document.

The attached document was released to [illegible], Courier Receipt No.

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SSS FORM NO. 3304
(REV. 1-48)

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Col. W. S. Little	ACCESSION NO.: DOTS 608
ADDRESSED TO: ELD	
DOCUMENT DATE: 17 Feb. 1945	ACCESSION DATE: 7 March 1945
DOCUMENT NO.: 44,562 COPY NO.:	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director
NO. OF PAGES: 31 ATTACHMENTS: 1	LOGGED BY: M. O'D. he

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The attached document was received from the _____ (name or office) Courier Receipt No. _____

	RECEIVED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO						
2.	Lt. R. Pilcher	[signature]	6/2	1600	[signature]	6/2	0945
3.		[signature]	6/2	1057	[signature]	6/2	1057
4.	Miss O'Donnell						
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

On return of the attached document from [illegible] TSCO must sign as [illegible] between this sheet from the document [illegible] document sheets in the files. He must then deliver the document in person to the TSCO issuing it or his authorized Courier receipt to this effect.

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

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
HEADQUARTERS, CHINA THEATER
APO 879

Japan
Little
Kaji
Intelligence

27 February 1945

SUBJECT: Attachments

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum to me from Colonel Herbert S. Little, and the documents referred to in his memorandum.

2. Extreme care should be taken in the handling of these documents, since carelessness might well result in the arrest of Kaji, who is the person referred to in Little's memorandum.

3. It may be that these documents are of the greatest importance. On the other hand, if they are a plant, it is felt that this will be easily discovered by the proper naval intelligence authorities.

Richard P. Heppner
RICHARD P. HEPPNER
Colonel, FA
Chief, OSS/CT

Attachments

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EYES ALONE

OSS

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TOP SECRET

27 February 1945

To: Col. Richard P. Heppner
From: Lt. Col. Herbert S. Little

Subject: Naval Intelligence.

DATS 68

1. Yesterday afternoon Major Harlan Stevens and I, while interviewing a certain party relative to an MD project, were handed the attached documents, which are parts 1 and 2, and relate to Japanese naval installations, tactics, etc. They are in Japanese and have not been translated. They should be translated only under the most secure conditions.

2. The background, reputation and motivation of the source lead us to believe that the documents are genuine. They were compiled by a few prisoners of war who were captured or surrendered following the naval and air battles off Formosa in the late fall of 1944. One or more of the prisoners had access to detailed Japanese naval secrets. Since their capture, they have become ardent anti militarists, (apparently sincerely) the source's past background, detailed examination of our personal acquaintance with the prisoners and his firm conviction on this point, are our only evidence). For this and other reasons, we are of the opinion that this is not a case of Japanese deception, though this remote possibility cannot be ruled out categorically. Naval experts in Washington, by comparison with other intelligence, probably can determine this point. If this possibility is ruled out, these documents may well prove to be of immense tactical and strategic value to the Navy in the Pacific.

3. These documents were handed to us on the condition that they not be disseminated in China and that their source not be divulged. The source stated that he had not given out any copies thereof and would not do so fearing that they might otherwise get into Japanese hands. Furthermore, if it became known that these documents had been given to us, severe pressures might be made or acted out against our source. This might dry up this and many other sources of valuable intelligence in the future, as well as stymie an MD project of very high priority. It is for these reasons that Major Stevens and I have decided to present this matter directly to you rather than through the regular channels.

4. It is recommended that the documents either, be transmitted by you directly to General Penson after his further handling with appropriate explanations relating thereto, or, taken by the undersigned to the General by safe hand, whereupon the source and other facts can be revealed in person to him.

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

OSS Form 1040

DATE 28 March 1945

TO: FE, Canada, Ecuador, Mexico

attached herewith is a preliminary and partial translation of the material handed to me yesterday evening. Note especially remarks 4 & 5 of Translator's Note. I cannot in the state-

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Lee DOTS 608

FROM: Clarence C. Burkhart EXT 2489

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TRANSLATOR's NOTES

In the three and a half hours which I have been working on this translation, several conclusions have been reached which I would like to call to your attention:

1. The length and the complexity of the material is such that (taking into consideration the different personal names as well as the different geographical names which have readings of their own) it is impossible for one person to translate it in a matter of hours.

2. In a word, it is the report of the cross examination of seven prisoners (airmen, Warrant Officers, Sergeants, 1st Class Privates, etc.) of the 98th Battle Force and the 703rd Air Company, or Unit. They were evidently picked up in the sea off Formosa during operations there in October and November, 1944.

3. The Report is in Two Parts. The First Part has been more or less translated and gives the details of names of units, bases, how these units are made up, their several districts and other tactical and strategic information, as well as explanation of training, equipment, weapons, machines, etc. The Second part is shorter, but gives organizational charts and especially, the names of officers and non-commissioned officers known to the seven Japanese prisoners.

4. It is evident from the way that some of the details are written that the report was collated and written by one or more Chinese. For instance, instead of naming China, as anyone who is not a Chinese would have done, he calls that country the Central Kingdom, or the Central Land. It is quite evident that he knows Japanese, but such unconscious use of Chinese terms gives him away. Furthermore, only ourselves (THE US Forces) and the Chinese were operating around Formosa at that time; though what the the Chinese were doing there is more than this writer can say.

5. It might be well (Since material of this kind should be already available) to have this report carefully translated so that it may be checked from any angle desired. Sometimes the Japanese are given to "planting" material where they think a spy or someone else might be interested in finding it. One of the reasons for the writer's suspicions is that the material is dated 1944 instead of the 19th Year of the Reign of Showa or the Era of Showa. But this may be because it was written by a Chinese who was used to our way of counting the years.

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Concerning the Naval AIR Force

According to the reports of seven prisoners belonging to the air Forces, (Of the 98th Battle Force and the 703rd Air Company - Unit -) captured during the operations in the offing off Formosa in October and November 1944.

(Here follow the names of the seven prisoners who are the sources of the information) (These are not given here, as the need for getting the gist of the information seems paramount, and the time at the TR.'s disposal is too short).

I. Names and bases of the Training Units of the Naval Air Force, as well as Operational Units.

1. TRAINING UNITS

Name	Base	Kind of training
Tsuchiura Air Unit	Tsuchiura City	Preliminary
Mie Air Unit	Mie Prefecture	"
Oi "	Shizuoka Prefecture	Reconnaissance
Reika "	Mie "	"
Aojima "	[illegible]	"
Shanghai "	"	"
Second Shikura Unit	Kagoshima Prefecture	Bombing
Kasumigaura Air Unit	Tsuchiura City	Manoeuvering
Omura "	Nagasaki Prefecture	Reconnaissance, etc.
Kokuba "	Kagoshima "	"

and so on.

2. OPERATIONAL UNITS

Name	Base	Duty
(Kisaraxu?)	Gemba Prefecture	501st, and 703rd Air Units, 701st Pursuit Unit
Kisaritsu Air Unit	"	(No notation)
[illegible]	Aichi Prefecture	"
Kanzan "	Oita "	"
Toychashi "	Kagoshima "	Defense Unit
Oita "	" "	(No notation)
Kasamohara "		
Kagoshima "		

and so on.

II. Names, duty and organization of Operational Units. (Attacking Units and Defense Units)

1. Attacking Units. (Carrier-borne fighters, Carrier-borne Bombers, Land-based Fighters, Land-based Bombers, Reconnaissance groups of both kinds)

a. 722nd Air Units:

501st Attack Unit
702nd "
704th "

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b. Attacking Unit (Shikaya):

(a) 762nd Air Unit
- 702(?) Attack Unit
- 703 "
- 705 "
- Ginka Unit (Bombing also Torpedo Unit)
- 98 Fighter Unit (Ki 67 Torpedo Unit)
- 7 Attack Unit (" ")
- 503 Reconnaissance Unit.

(b) Naval Large Carrier Unit: Fourth Discharge(?) Airplane Carriers (Kawasaki type used)

(c) Naval Reconnaissance: No. 13 Reconnaissance Unit (Using a type of plane resembling Army type Reconnaissance plane)

Remarks (Omitted)

2. Defense Units. (Attacking Units, Reconnaissance Units)

a. Tora Unit (Tiger) Attack Unit
Okami (Wolf) Unit "
(Hyo) Heyo (Leopard) Unit "
Shishi (Lion) Unit "
Kurozawa Unit Fighter Unit
Matsui Unit 305th Fighter Unit

b. TO (East) Unit (Could be Higashi) 102nd Fighter Unit
TO Unit 103rd Fighter Unit
TO Unit 104th "
CHU (Central) Unit 105th Fighter Unit
SAI (West) Unit 107th Fighter Unit

Notes: (Omitted)

III. Latest types of Operational Planes, Operational District Districts, Unit Names and Unit Strength.

a. Operational Area	Name of Unit	Strength of Unit & Kind of Plane
Indian Ocean, New Guinea, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, Seas, also over land in these districts (SouthWest)	First Air Fleet XIX CO: Lt-Gen. (No name)	Overland Attack Unit: 11th Attack Type 2 Units, made up of 4 Sub Units Overland Bombing Unit: Kinka Land Bomber 2 Units made up of 4 Sub Units Carrier Based Attack Units: TENZAN Fighter Plane 2 Units made up of 4 Sub Units Carrier Based Bombers: SUISEI Bombers 2 Units made up of 4 Sub Units And so on.
b. South Kyushu, Formosa, Philippines.	Second Air Fleet	Same as above.
c. Kwajo, Marshalls, Marianas, etc.	Third Air Fleet	Same as above

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II. Defense Operations of the Naval Air Arm.

a. Omitted.
(a) Omitted
(b) Omitted
(c) Omitted

b. Omitted

III. The Art and means used in Direct attack.
1. Omitted.
2. Omitted.
3. Omitted.
4. Omitted.
5. Omitted.

V. Special Attack Units.
1. Aim. (Omitted)
2. Materials for developing the attack.
a. Omitted.
b. Omitted
3. Explanation of Training (Omitted)
4. Who are to be used (Omitted)
5. Duty (Omitted)
6. Rules of Warfare (Omitted)
7. Organization (Omitted)

VI. Army Special Warfare Art: (Self-blasting machines)
1. Names (Omitted)
2. Aim (Omitted)
3. Explanation of Training (Omitted)
4. Organization (Omitted).

VII. EXAMINATION OF THE POWER OF THE NAVY
1. Kinds, names, numbers and capacities of Carriers(?) (Omitted)
2. Names, Organization, etc. of the Navy. (Omitted)
3. Training Schools, etc. of the Navy. (Omitted)

VIII. Army and Navy Air Fleets.

1. Duties. Units.
A. Duties (Omitted)
B. Units. (Omitted)

IX. United operation between the Army's 98th Attacking Unit and the Navy.

1. Progress. (Omitted)
2. Operations (Omitted)
a. Training (Omitted)
b. Operational Districts (Omitted)

X. Machines and materials as well as weapons and equipment.
1. Torpedoes (Omitted)
2. Bombs (Omitted)
3. Communication Instruments (Omitted)

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

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

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

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

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

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1945 MAR 5 PM 4 | 5 March 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. (jg) E. J. Putzell, JrSS

From: Edward W. Haines

Subject: Memorandum from General Donovan re: Microfilmsof Japanese Departures and Returnees.

1. The records of the Japanese who left this country, and those who thereafter returned, were microfilmed to the number of 20,000 and forwarded here to the Central Information Division of MAA, under the direction of Lt. George B. Young, USNR. Of these 20,000, about 3,000 have been enlarged, which work is still continuing.

2. X-2 has had access to these records held by CID, and has known generally of them. Colonel Pfaff states, however, that any extensive use of the records by X-2 would involve expenditures of time and personnel which he does not feel is justified, and that X-2 has no facilities now to actively use the microfilms. However, they will be referred to from time to time.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Lieut. (jg) H. J. Petrelli, Jr., USNR
Asst. Executive Officer

DATE: 17 February 1948

TO: Lt. Colonel Donald E. Gregory USMC

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Attached, is memorandum which General Donovan left today for forwarding to you. It relates to certain records which were either destroyed and sent back to the General Information Division of G & A -- Lieutenant George E. Young, USNR, is fully acquainted with the matter.

Enclosure: (1)

cc: Mr. Howard M. Hallett
Field Section, Executive Office

[redacted]

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16,355

[redacted] Pulgel

On Jan 15th
The San Francisco
Complete sending
micro film of
the [redacted] Dept
of Justice and
[redacted] County and
have returned -
See if X-2 has
had access - C/D
has it -

Out
card
the

Evd No. [redacted]

Exposure # [redacted]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: Dr. William L. Langer

DATE: 15 December 1944

FROM: Edwin M. Martin

SUBJECT: Evaluation of "Confidential Reports from Tokyo"

With the time permitted the Far East Division has checked the facts and predictions contained in these reports against such data as are available to us. Obviously our lack of knowledge of conditions inside Japan and of developments within the Japanese controlled areas has made it impossible to check many of the items.

In general we are impressed with the accuracy of the facts and predictions which we were able to check and with the sober, prosaic character of the statements contained in the reports. If this is in any sense a raw intelligence report, we are much impressed by the selection of the subjects covered. It represents a comprehensive and highly intelligent view of the functions of an intelligence reporting system.

In the economic field the reports contained in Item 5 with respect to the Japanese shipbuilding problem are in general agreement with reports received from OWI on this subject, although the statement that large ship construction is "practically at a stand-still" sounds slightly exaggerated. Nevertheless, we have no evidence on the basis of which we can deny this.

In the political field there is considerable doubt in our minds as to whether the stand in paragraph 8 that the downfall of Tojo's Cabinet was accelerated by food shortages is not confirmed by evidence available to us. In other respects paragraph 8 seems to us a good analysis of the situation which led up to the fall of the Tojo Cabinet. It may place somewhat too much emphasis on the actual influence of the Palace officials, yet this is a point on which there can be honest differences of opinion.

On military questions such as [illegible] we have been able to check its contents, and the figures on freight damage which can be carried by the Maikka-Osaka rail communications appear to us to be reasonable.

SECRET

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[redacted]

[redacted]

TO: Dr. William L. Langer

DATE: 15 December 1944

FROM: Edwin M. Martin

SUBJECT: Evaluation of "Confidential Reports from Tokyo"

With the time permitted the Far East Division has checked the facts and predictions contained in these reports against such data as are available to us. Obviously our lack of knowledge of conditions inside Japan and of developments within the Japanese controlled areas has [illegible] it impossible to check many of the items.

In general we are impressed with the accuracy of the facts and predictions which we were able to check and with the sober, precise character of the statements contained in the reports. If this is in any sense a raw intelligence report, we are much impressed by the selection of the subjects covered. It represents a comprehensive and highly intelligent view of the functions of an intelligence reporting system.

In the economic field the reports contained in Item 1 with respect to the Japanese shipbuilding problem are in general agreement with reports received from ONI on this subject, although the statement that large ship construction is "probably at a standstill" seems slightly exaggerated. Nevertheless, we have no evidence on the basis of which we can deny this.

In the political field there is considerable doubt in our minds as to whether the items in paragraph 1 that are classified as Top Secret are sufficiently important to warrant such classification by evidence available to us. In other respects paragraph 1 seems to us a good example of the information which we get out of the high officials. In any event we would appreciate an indication of the source of the [illegible] information, and also to a point on which there may be legal restrictions of [illegible].

In answering questions [illegible] as we have been able to check it ourselves, and of the [illegible] we are to depend [illegible] and comments which [illegible] us in the meantime.

[redacted]

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Edwin M. Martin

DATE: 13 December 1944

FROM : Stanley Hoffmann

SUBJECT: Japanese translations

The following are comments on the sources translated in the attached document:

[redacted] 1 April 1944

This particular issue is not available in Washington. Only six numbered issues for 1943 and 1944 are available. This is a general economic publication, not of great value to us.

[redacted] March 1944

This issue is available in IDC as are four other issues for 1943 and 1944.

[redacted] February, March, and May 1944

The first issue is available in the original in this Division, having been accessioned recently from SI. The last mentioned is in IDC. Seven other issues for 1942 - 1944 are available. Both this and [redacted] are popular monthly periodicals.

[redacted] 29 April 1944

This particular issue is available in IDC. Our coverage on this periodical is better than the others translated in the attached document. About 25 issues from 1942 to 1944 are available. This is considered one of our most valuable sources of information on specific industries and installations, as well as general economic trends.

[redacted]

This cannot be identified. The [redacted] is a daily newspaper. A weekly edition has not been identified. The [redacted] is a weekly pictorial of which we have only a handful of issues.

[redacted] 15 March 1944

This likewise cannot be identified. It is possible that this is

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the Nippon Sangyo Keizai (literally Japan's Industrial Economy)- a daily newspaper similar to our Journal of Commerce. We have about twenty 1944 issues of this publication, but not the issue mentioned.

Kimbrew

I have never heard of this publication and no record of it exists in IDC.

Attachment - 1

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13 December 1944

Mr. Edwin L. Martin

Stanley Hornbeck

Japanese translations

The following are comments on the sources translated in the attached documents:

Asahi Weekly, 1 April 1944

This particular issue is not available in Washington. Only six scattered issues for 1943 and 1944 are available. This is a general censored publication, and of great value to us.

Chuo, March 1944

This issue is available in DC as are four other issues for 1943 and 1944.

Kaizo, February, March, and May 1944

The first issue is available in the original in this division, having been specially flown to us. The last mentioned is in DC. Seven other issues for 1943 - 1944 are available, both this and Kaizo are popular monthly periodicals.

Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, 29 April 1944

This particular issue is available in DC. Our coverage of this periodical is quite good, the entire translated in the original compact. About 25 issues for 1943 to 1944 are available. This is a compact one of our most valuable sources of information on specific industries and institutions, as well as general economic trends.

Nippon Keizai

This cannot be identified. The Nippon Keizai is a daily newspaper. A weekly edition has not been identified. The Nippon Keizai is a weekly periodical of which we have only a limited number of issues.

Industrial Japan, 15 March 1944

This Mimeo cannot be identified. It is possible that this is

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the Finnish Security Police (literally [illegible]) [illegible] a daily newspaper similar to our [illegible]. We have about twenty USA issues of this publication, but all the issues mentioned.

Division

I have never heard of this publication and no record of it exists in IDC.

Attachment #1 [illegible]

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JAPAN'S WEAKNESSES AND FEARS

Japanese straightforward admission of weaknesses and fears vis-à-vis the United States.

(1) IWAI Ryotaro writing on the "Lessons from the Solomons Campaign" (Economics Nanichi, April 1, 1944) points out the fact that in the American-Japanese War in the Pacific are discovered three new factors hitherto unknown in the war annals. First, the appearance of large air force which does much to change the nature of war. Secondly, the conception of naval warfare has been changed from "Line Strategy" to "Plane Strategy" by the fact that the whole of the Pacific has become one battle-ground in which submarines and airplanes play the most active part, involving losses of hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping, sunk or damaged, and thousands of planes, shot down or destroyed on ground. This necessarily change the basic principles governing the preparations for a war of such magnitude. Thirdly, the Americans seem to be over-confident in final victory. An American war prisoner captured on the Burma front is said to have told a Japanese correspondent that "America has never been defeated in history and this time she will most decidedly win. "This may not be dismissed", writes Iwai, "as the truculent and proud words of a war prisoner, for judging from various indications on American psychology such confidence does exist in every American mind. Be they the dupes of propaganda or fanatical dreamers, this confidence is an invisible national strength. It is no simple thing to crush this strength."

(2) The interview between IWAKURO Torao and Admiral [redacted] (Kaizo, May Issue) gives an insight into the Japanese mind which refuses to fight.

[redacted]: The fighting around Rabaul is daily growing serious. If the territories around Rabaul fall into the enemy's hands then the whole of the south regions will be endangered. For then the enemy would be able to attack the Philippines from both New Guinea and Guam and cut the communications between Japan Proper and the Southern regions. Furthermore, Rabaul would be used as a starting point for an island-to-island push toward Japan. This is very important. At present the American air base has been moved to the Marshalls, one step nearer to Japan, and our communications and supply lines are being thereby threatened. Admiral [redacted] declared his intention [redacted] a decisive war with the Japanese fleet. Does he mean to force a decisive battle on us when we are short of aircraft, or merely make empty words when he has not had the opportunity of seeing the Japanese fleet? Anyhow, if the American fleet [redacted] the time for a decisive battle will [redacted] for sure. In the future when both the [redacted] are wiped out of the sky, a decisive battle will be fought between the fleets of [redacted] powers. [redacted] the superiority in air [redacted] in numbers. [redacted] inner perimeter is [redacted] the first condition to [redacted] from communications and [redacted] in and out of that line. Inherently it is difficult to

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say that that perimeter is an advantage to Japan.

INADA: They say that the Japanese submarines are too much occupied with other missions than their own. For instance, during the Gaudalcanal campaign the submarines were engaged in transporting munitions and foodstuffs. What is your opinion about that?

SUETSUGU: That is true. Even the German submarines which had performed splendid services have been, for precisely the same reason, very much less active since last spring. It is really regrettable that such a small number of Japanese submarines have to be ordered for other services and to lose the chance of showing their fighting quality.

INADA: The phrase "confidence in the certainty of victory" should be accompanied with something more concrete.....

SUETSUGU: I quite agree with you. Undue optimism such as reflected in, "Japan being a sacred nation can never be defeated; our enemy should learn what had become of the Mongol invaders!", would only lead people astray.

(3) Commander TAKASE Goro of the Information Dept., Imperial Headquarters, has reviewed the Pacific War in an article under the caption, "Looking Straight into the Counter-Offensive in the Pacific", and some of the interesting points are quoted as follows:

a. The Recent American Moves.

The salient fact highly worthy of our attention is that the U.S.Navy has been used as the main force in the general counter-offensive against Japan..... No sooner had the Americans reached the Marshalls than they had started to attack Truk. They will push toward the Carolines and the Marianas, from Marianas to the Bonins, and from Bonins to Japan Proper. All these are not altogether impossible. They will adopt the island-hopping tactics to thrust into our inner defense line. They try to retake the Philippines and obtain a foothold on the China Coast, from which to sever our communication lines to the Southern regions. The American air forces will continue to bomb Japan in an attempt to deal a crushing blow to our production.....

b. Admiral Nimitz's Strategy.

Although the Americans had suffered great losses at the Gilberts and the Marshalls, their invasion must be regarded as a success, which has been made possible because of their formidable battleships and aircraft-carriers. By the action of a fleet it is easy to attack the Carolines from the Marshalls. It is equally easy for a fleet to approach the Japanese waters wherefrom to launch a large-scale air attacks on Japan, provided it be supplied with sufficient fuel and ammunition for the duration of the operations. This constitutes the naval threat. Moreover, Admiral Nimitz's fleet represents the main force of the American Pacific Fleet and we cannot belittle its striking power. In all landing operations the Americans always employ a

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force five or six times as large as the Japanese garrisons and have strong air support. This sort of condition constitutes decidedly a radical departure from the former island-to-island tactics conducted from a base four or five thousand miles away.....The Americans have already declared that after a decisive battle the final victory will be undoubtedly theirs, even if both of the Japanese and American fleets are reduced to naught. The Americans count of course on their productive power as the real deciding factor.....Although Japan has the advantage of the Inner Defense Line and the unsinkable aircraft carriers, yet she must get the necessary aircraft. Air bases alone are of no avail. The conditions in the Marshalls can testify to this truth.

c. Don't Overlook the Enemy's Moves.

In the North, ever since Kiska and Attu were retaken, the Americans and Canadians have strengthened their air power there, and as a result air raids on the Kuriles have recently been on the increase though with small number of planes..... That the American intentions in the North are a part of the whole strategy in the general counter-offensive is well-known. Should they succeed in occupying a corner of the Kuriles it would serve as a useful springboard for the onslaught on the mainland. We must closely watch that..... In the Dutch East Indies there are still guerrilla air battles which are designed to hamper our reconstruction there..... On the Burma front the enemy is hotly engaged in the counter-offensive..... It may be presumed that the enemy's general counter-offensive will begin in the first half of this year. The enemy believes that given time Japan's strength will be redoubled. Therefore, he must make haste.....

XIV Japan's "Command of the Air".

In an article (Fuji, Mar. 1944) under the caption "The Invincible Imperial Army", by Major S. Goto, Information Dept., Imperial Headquarters, a straightforward confession of Japan's weakness in the air is voiced as follows:

On the Burma front the average monthly sorties of the enemy planes in the recent months amounted to 4,000.... In the South Sea regions they averaged 30,000 sorties in one month, that is, in all, an average of 800 sorties daily. Frankly speaking, this command of the air on these fronts really [illegible] in the week before it [illegible] and 30 minutes in the week after it [illegible] When enemy raids our bases he usually comes in great force of some 200 planes, and our fighters sent up to intercept them are usually less than 100. We would achieve a great feat if any 100 enemy planes were brought down. But then the rest 150 planes which succeeded in getting through the gauntlet would have our landing fields, supply bases etc. entirely at their mercy..... Taking the German raid on England as an example, 300-400 German raiders are usually intercepted by 700-800 allied fighters. Even this the raiders, at least fifty percent of them, can always reach their objectives..... Our air force in the South Sea

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regions is only one ..th (censored) of the enemy's force. For this reason, we have been fighting at incredible odds.

III The quality of Japanese aircraft.

In the February issue of "Hinode" Lt.-General HIDO Saburo, head of the Aeronautic Bureau, Ministry of Grainance, discussed under the caption, "The Key to Air Victory", two incidents in which Lt.-Generals Watanuki and Kami sacrificed their lives because of the inferiority of Japan's aircraft.

(1) "In September 1941, General Watanuki conducted an air raid on Szechuan. Although he reached his objective he found that the bombs could not for some technical disorders be released. Realizing the hopeless situation he decided to make for home base. Suddenly he discovered that his gasoline was rapidly running out and that one of the two engines already stopped functioning. Yet nothing could be done to release the bombs. Rapidly the plane began to lose height until it could not possibly pass over the mountain ranges of the Szechuan-Hupeh borders. At such juncture General Watanuki had no other course to take but to perish together with his plane.

(2) "Another incident of disaster took place over the sky of Palembang, Sumatra, just before the fall of Singapore, when General Kami's plane during a combat, either through excessive speed or some other reason, suddenly manifested to its doom as one wing gave way.

IV Japan's problem of replacement.

(1) Lt.-General Tsuruga discusses replacement in the February issue of Hinode as follows:

"The naval war of modern times is essentially a war of mechanization... In proportion as [illegible] is to be... While [illegible] in great haste from the [illegible] planned production [illegible]

(2) In the same issue of Hinode, Lt.-General [illegible]

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Here we see very clearly how replenishment can affect the front line. At the present moment even if the enemy cuts down his shipping space by fifty per cent we are comparatively still in an inferior position.

(3) In the March issue of Fuji, Major Goto writes: "While the enemy enjoys the command of the air we find it extremely difficult to supply our troops with ammunition, medical supplies and foodstuffs. In Guadalcanal our troops often were forced to eat herbs, grass-roots, and if by a stroke of luck some lizards or snakes could be caught once or twice a month, it would mean a great treat. Sometimes ant-nests are dug out and be cooked in the sea water as food."

IV The Japanese Army tactics "imitated" by the American Army.

KONDO Eijiro discusses in Asahi Weekly how the American Army "imitated" and in fact bettered Japan's tactics as follows: "The modern 'Forced Landing' is an invasion of the Imperial Japanese Army out of the long experiences gained in the 'China Incident'. There were no less than 13 Forced Landings all successfully made in the Yangtse River regions alone. The landings effected in Sicily, South-West Pacific, New Guinea were of the same nature as the Imperial Army tactics. The American 'By Pass' tactics corresponds to what the Imperial Army used in the Yangtse and Sumatra campaigns. The Halsey tactics of using small boats by commando forces to outflank or attack from the rear of the enemy is also an imitation of the Japanese tactics. The essential requirement of such tactics is the especially adapted landing boats..... However, it is noteworthy that the Americans have not only learned well our tactics but also made rapid improvements in the construction of such boats. It is reported that there are more than 80,000 such boats already built. If one tenth of these boats are used in the South Pacific, it would surely cause formidable pains to the Imperial Army.

V Japanese Industrialists in Jitters.

(1) In "Toyo Keizai", April 20, the Japanese industrial conditions are described as follows: "While the bonds of necessaries go up, those of raw materials decidedly go down. Coal and copper conditions are also very bad. This is all the more alarming when the raw materials on hand are limited and there is little hope of importing from without. At this time to devise ways and means to make us sufficient, the government has paid close attention to such conditions, and ever since last year a fund for encouragement of increased production was established and prices were also readjusted, recently loans have been extended to the coal industry and other raw material developments as well. In other words, protective measures have been greatly introduced. However, the present conditions on the market show anything but promising. This speaks plainly that the financiers and manufacturers have all no far lost their interest and their lasting faith in long-term enterprises.

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(2) In "Industrial Japan", March 15, Moriaki writes: "We have recently heard that those occupying responsible positions in the munition industries have been timid and shirking responsibility in every way possible. Many have resigned directorship. This tendency certainly baffles our comprehension..... We know that in the regulations governing 'Responsibility of War Production' there is a clause providing for extenuation of guilt under circumstances beyond control. This should be interpreted as a measure of moderation to remove the fears on the part of those in high positions of war production. For this reason, we find it all the more incomprehensible."

IV Sabotage.

Lt.-Colonel Akiyama reveals a case of sabotage and bribery in a discussion group ("Kinodo, March issue) as follows: "Recently there is a case of wastage of some 7,700 tons of aluminium alloy, a very important material for aircraft. The true cause lies with a sort of pre-meditated plan of producing parts not according precisely to designs, for it has nothing to do with the unskillfulness of labor or bad designs. There are in fact cases of bribery in this connection."

XIV Japan's food production.

In "Kinkoken", page 5,(issued April 1) the food problem of Japan is described as follows:

"According to reports from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the harvest in Japan Proper yielded last year 62,887,000 piculs, showing a decrease of 3,[illegible],000 piculs against that of the year before last.

"This year the demand for foods is higher because of the increase of population. The problem is the acutest this year since the shipping from outside of rice and auxiliary foodstuffs is getting more and more difficult. Much will depend on the importation of Korean and Formosan rice. Barley, wheat, soybeans and other cereals are now being mobilized in Manchuria to be shipped to Japan. Even this does not seem to be able to cope with the situation. Although there are plans for increased production, the shortage of labor, fertilizer and other necessary factors makes it impossible to execute them.

"In the last day (May 24) of the recent session of the Diet, a proposal to readjust prices as an encouragement to farmers' war-efforts was adopted. Granted that this may somewhat increase the production, but [illegible] will be very much limited and far below [illegible].

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the week following June 13-19, Japan's freight tonnage to Busan, Pusan, Incheon and Inchon exceeded the total tonnage of the [illegible] ports, and in the corresponding period Japan's freight tonnage to Formosa, Ryukyus Islands, Philippine Islands and Thailand mutually doubled the key tonnage to the same ports.

A neutral observer is of the opinion that in the former case it is possible that the Japanese Government is now shipping the important resources-materials and machineries to Manchuria, and in the latter August supplies are being rushed to the China and the Pacific fronts.

(4) Talk with Japanese military informant (Report dated from Tokyo June 20)

He called on important military conference on June 19 at his official residence, and the topics discussed or decisions reached are as follows:

(a) In his review of the military situation in China he pointed out that according to the plan laid down by the Imperial Headquarters the railway system linking Canton and Hankow is expected to be in working order by the end of September and the freight capacity would be increased from 3,000 tons to 10,000 tons by the end of this year, and then they would not only be easy with the transportation of the new [illegible] were made, but there would also be ample supplies of munitions and [illegible] for the Chinese Army. He said the army would [illegible] with the utmost will through [illegible].

(b) A new air [illegible] was [illegible] for the recent air [illegible] in Hankow [illegible] Chinese Army [illegible] rather to enable them to resist [illegible].

(c) For two days past they [illegible] conference, during the different opinions on [illegible] were [illegible] and some very much [illegible]. [illegible] and they [illegible] and to decide [illegible]

1. The first point [illegible] Japan can well afford to [illegible] fighting power [illegible] them to choose a favorable [illegible] the decision [illegible] the opposite. It is impossible to open the Indochinese [illegible] traffic, strengthen the [illegible] the Japan-China [illegible] to prevail for a decisive war with the U.S. and [illegible] the [illegible] of a possible loss of the [illegible].

2. The second [illegible] is positive planning. It also, however, [illegible] to [illegible] in order to [illegible] the [illegible] against this Japan [illegible] a [illegible] offensive [illegible] the U.S. and [illegible] on this [illegible].

[illegible] to begin [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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on both sides. Consequently he had to manage to do the easiest thing by steering a middle course.

In the present conference the problem was most heatedly debated without coming, however, to a definite conclusion. It was decided that the General Staffs were to make a thorough study of the different views and submit a comprehensive report thereof for future deliberations.

(d) In connection with this conference, it is reliably reported that in Sasebo, Nagasaki, Kishiro and Kawata are now available vessels aggregating some 1,150,000 tons for purposes unknown.

(5) Japan's shipbuilding problem (Report dated from Shanghai, June 16)

According to sources in close touch with the Japanese Navy, Japan's plans of constructing large ships are practically at a standstill because of the acute shortage of steel, iron, motor engines and essential machineries. At present only medium sized ships under 5,000 tons, for coastal patrols and destroyers, are being built at Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Kitakyushu Dockyards. The naval docks are engaged in repair works, while the large docks such as those at Yokosuka have since long suspended work. Nearly all civilian dockyards are now engaged in building wooden boats.

(6) Japanese Army Air Force (Report dated from Shanghai, June 20)

The Japanese Air Force belonging to the Imperial Army is trained in the following 15 schools:

Name	Specialized Training
Air Cadet School	Air cadets
Air Tactics School	Tactics
Ground Staff School	Ground staff works
Tokyo Aeronautic School	Air Youth Corps
Osaka " "	" "
Hamamatsu " "	" "
Otsu " "	Air Tactics
Tachikawa " "	"
Hamamatsu " "	"
Akeno " "	Reconnaissance
Hamamatsu " "	Combat
Ushiku " "	Bombing
Iruma " "	"
Hiro " "	Air Raid Precaution
No. 11 & 12 Combined Air Corps	Advanced A.A.F.

Apart from the Nos. 11 & 12 Combined Air Corps, there is a Combined Special Training Corps commanded by Kagawa. The 11th C. A. Corps is now commanded by Lieut.-General Terauchi and the 12th by Lieut.-General Prince Takamatsu.

The First Class of the volunteer-students enrolled last winter and spring graduated in the end of last May, and the Second Class will graduate by the end of July. These students will be used for surprise attacks.

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The Imperial Japanese Army and Navy at loggerheads.

That the Japanese Army and Navy are at loggerheads on strategy is an old story. The following report based on sources close to the Japanese Navy gives an insight into the extent of their conflict and its serious consequences.

(A) Ever since the outbreak of the Pacific War the discord between the Army and the Navy on matters of strategy has often developed into sharp conflict affecting the whole course of the war. The main points of conflict may be traced and analysed as follows:

(1) In point of strategy the Navy stood originally for the defensive, but with the change of strategical values as the war progressed it changed to the offensive. That is to say, soon after the occupation of the Malaya and the Philippines, the Navy reverted its original plan and insisted on (a) an invasion of Australia in order to destroy all the Allied bases for the counter-offensive, and also on (b) an intensive air attack on the American mainland hoping thereby to create panic or a psychological moment favorable for Japan to conclude the war. However, at that time, the Army believed that Japan's power was not equal to that task and therefore adopted a passive policy in order to build up strength by digesting the occupied territories and wait for opportune moment for greater enterprises. This was a period when the Navy insisted on an active strategy and the Army remained on the passive and the defensive.

(2) But when the Allies commenced the counter-offensive in the Pacific, the Army, apparently impelled by disastrous defeats, suddenly reverted its strategy to the offensive and urged the Navy to accept the American challenge. This the Navy declined on grounds of difficulty in replenishment of battle ships and trained crew, and instead advocated a strategy of readjustment of defense lines in order to preserve power for the decisive battle. With an inactive Navy the burden of defense of the Pacific islands falls on the Army whose garrison troops fight as they are to the last upon their fortress hope and cease firing and die when in complete annihilation. This is the present period in which the Army insists on an active strategy while the Navy remains inactive and on the defensive.

It is not surprising that the little rift within the lute should easily bring about disasters of the first magnitude. We have had to do something to cure the situation. The result was the dismissal of Imperial Headquarters Operations Chiefs of operations, and high officials [illegible] over these petty arrangements.

(B) As the war goes on its real [illegible] there appears a tendency of [illegible] between the Army and the Navy, as may be seen in the following cases.

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

(3) [illegible]

(4) [illegible]

(5) [illegible]

(6) [illegible]

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(5) Conduct intensive training of the new air corps and also the special naval corps, all for surprise attacks. These corps are expected to see action in this fall, and they are counted on to destroy the Allied counter-offensive so thoroughly that the Allies would not be able to come back for at least six months.
(6) The Navy's main forces will continue to remain inactive until Japan's mainland is attacked, for such inactivity would wear an appearence of an unknown force and unknown strength, which should make the Allies heritate to land on Japan Proper.

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(B) Comments on the fall of Tojo Cabinet

By the time when Tojo resolutely decided to reshuffle his cabinet and to take over the Supreme Command last spring all had augured ill for his prospect. These measures he adopted because he had to do something to prepare his Government to face the two important crises, which would reach their climax by June, namely, (1) the large-scale battles on the continent and in the Pacific, and (2) the food shortage in Japan. These crises proved subsequently the immediate causes of his downfall.

There were a number of reasons for Tojo's precarious position. He came into sharp conflict with the elder statesmen and treated them so obtrusively as to demand of them not to criticise the war situation in the Pacific. The war production came practically to a standstill. Externally, his confidence in Russia was badly shaken. Prince Mashimoto's impeachment of his negligence in the pacific defense works struck him a fatal blow. Fatal, because all the Imperial Princes have access to the fountain source of power, known as the "Palace" or the "Palace clique". Indeed, no premier of Japan can maintain his position if he has incurred the displeasure of the "Palace".

It may be recalled that when Adiai returned to Japan on May 2nd, last, rumor was rife that Tojo was about to resign. At that time, our special reports had it that either Terauchi or Yonai would be chosen to supersede Tojo. This speaks plainly that both Koiso and Yonai had since then been implicated in the machination that aimed at Tojo's downfall. And, indeed, Tojo's cabinet collapsed much in the same manner as did the Tanaka and Hiranuma cabinets, all having been literally forced to resign at the instance of the "Palace".

In his attempts to save the situation, Tojo called several military conferences, only to find himself more than ever baffled by divergent opinions on strategy, especially between the Army and the Navy. In his very last attempt, he resigned from the concurrent post of General Staff and dismissed Shimada. All this proved futile, as it helped his cabinet to survive hardly 19 hours. It was simply because that a decision to remove him had already been taken inside the "Palace".

Although the collapse of the Tojo Cabinet was the result of a well laid out plan, it yet took the elder statesmen to sit twice in conference before the successor could be chosen. This is because (1) that Terauchi who might have been chosen was could not be relieved of his important command, (2) that Sugiyama who had just been ousted from the Imperial Headquarters by Tojo was not considered a suitable successor, and (3) that Yonai because of his unpleasant relations with Hata, whose resignation from the War Ministry had caused the collapse of Yonai's former cabinet, preferred to support to Koiso instead of trying it again himself. Inasmuch as the Navy is highly dissatisfied with the war situation and yet on the Navy will depend the protection of Japan's mainland, Admiral Yonaimua therefore summoned to collaborate with Koiso in the formation of the new cabinet. It was a rare combination, but necessarily it be so.

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SECRET

REPORT FROM [redacted]

(1) A military conference held sometime ago in Tokyo had reached the following decisions:-

(a) To enforce compulsory evacuation of leading civilians and strengthen the air [redacted] to avoid casualties;

(b) To strengthen the defense works in Okinawa Island; [redacted] the Japanese Army and the militarists in Okinawa;

(c) To [redacted] of the Navy and in Okinawa [redacted] and the defense of Okinawa.

(2) Current information and its [redacted]

(a) [redacted]

(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

(d) [redacted]

[redacted]

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Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

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